A study on Philippine monetary and banking policies by Bautista, Ernesto D.
ASTUDYONPHILIPPINEMONETARY
ANDBANKINGPOLICIES
ErnestoD.Bautista
WORKINGPAPERSERIESNO.92.11
August1992
PhilippineInstituteforDevelopmentS udies
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I Introducuon 1
Ii Conceptual Framework 2
III Phdlppme Fmancml system Institutional Structure and Performance 5
IV Impact of Existing Monetary Crecht and Banking Faclhlaes 18
V Monetary and Bankmg Pohcles for Agro Industrial Development
InchcaUve Impacts and LeglslaUve/AdrmmstraUve Requtrements 60
VI Summary and Conclusions 73
LIST OF TABLES
1 Total Resources of the Philippine Financial System Selected Years 6
2 Total Loan Portfoho of the Philippine Financial System Selected Years 7
3 TotalDepos_ts of the Phlhppme Financial System Selected Years 8
4 Total Capital Accounts of the Philippine Financial System Selected Years 9
5 Number and D_smbuuon of Flnanc_al Inst_tuttons selected Years 10
6 Real Growth of the Phdlppme Financial System Selected Indacators 11
7 Short and Medtum Term Impact of Exlstang Monetary
Credtt and Banking Pohcles 19
8 Growth Rates and Other Economac Indicators for Country Groups with Posmve
Moderately Negative and Strongly Negatwe Interest Rates 23
9 Year end Reserve Requn.ement Rauos on Deposits
and Deposit Subsututes by Bank Type 24
10 Components of the Average lntermedtat_onCost 27
11 Summary of Changes m Central Bank Regulations 1986 1991 29
12 Changes m the Minimum Capital Requn'ements by Bank Type 55
13 Indacattve Short and Long Term Inputs of Suggested Monetary Credit
and Banking Facdlttes and then" Assocmted Legislative and
AdrmmstraUve Requn.ements 63
14 Outstanding Redlscounts of the Central Bank Loans Outstanding
of Commercial Banks and Export Values 72
LIST OF FIGURES
1. Transmission of the Impact of Monetary Policy on the Real Sectors ............................ 4
2. Assets of the Banking System ..................................................................................... 14
3. Liabilities of the Banking System ............................................................................... 15
4. Deposits of the Banking System ................................................................................. 16
5. Networth of the Banking System ................................................................................ 17
A STUDYONPHILIPPINEMONETARY
ANDBANKING.POLICIES*
ErnestoD.Bautista**
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past few decades, control over monetary and financial market policies was usec
by governments in most developing countries as an important tool in their development strategies.
To accelerate industrialization under an import substitution strategy, many countries including the
Philippines intervened pervasively in their financial markets through selective creditpolicies, interest
rate controls, fiscal or tax incentives and overvaluation of the currency. A few, such as South Korea
and Singapore, attempted early on to integrate their economies with international markets through an
export-based strategy. Most developing countries believed that without interventions in their
financial markets, financial institutions would continue to service only the most capitalized sectors,
neglecting the rural and other sectors considered to be at the forefront of development.
The monetary authorities of these countries implemented accommodative or expansionary
monetary po.lieies complemented by various banking policies. In many cases, the central bank went
beyond its traditional supervisory and price stabilization function, to act as a development banker
performing credit appraisal and management of special lending programs.
Cumulative experience from various countries has shown that extensive interventions in
financial markets have led to allocative inefficiency, financial distress and underdevelopment of the
financial system, ultimately affecting economic performance. In countries with highly protectionist
trade regimesand macroeconomic instability, directed credit programs reinforced existing
distortions. In countries that minimized price and other distortions and maintained macroeconomic
stability, these programs appeared to have been more successful (World Bank 1989). The impact of
directed credit, however, extends beyond allocative efficiency. Many of these programs have become
nonperforming loans. The distorted allocation of resources and the erosion of financial discipline have
left many intermediaries unprofitable, and in many cases insolvent. Availability of cheap funds
from the rediscount window of the Central Bank (CB) undermines savings mobilization and efficient
management of loan portfolio, leading to a lower level of financial intermediation. Moreover, by
encouraging firms to borrow from banks, directed credit programs have impeded the development
of capital markets.
The unfavorable impact on financial market development and growth, exacerbated by the
developments in the international market during the 1980s, exposed the fragile economic foundation
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2of most developing countries. Confronted with deteriorating terms of trade, failing export volumes,
rising international interest rates, and a sudden curtailment of foreign lending, many countries no
longer had the foreign exchange to finance large current account deficits or the fiscal resources to
subsidize inefficient industries or sectors. More than ever, these developments underscored the
importance of sound monetary policy and efficient financial system mobilizing domestic resources to
finance development.
This study assesses Philippine monetary and banking policies with the view of identifying
preferred policy options and features of a monetary and banking policy program supportive of overall
economic growth and, in particular, of ago-industrial development. The specific objectives are:
1. Describe the impact of existing monetary and banking policy on short- and long-term
economic development;
2. Identify the general features of monetary and banking policy supportive of agro-
industrial development;,
3. Describe the expected short- and long-run impact of adopting such monetary and
banking policy on specific sectors and on the economy as a whole; and
4. Describe the legislative and administrative measures required to adopt and implement
such a monetary and banking policy.
To address these objectives, the paper is organized in four sections. Section 1 gives an overall
picture of the present study. Section 2 presents a conceptual framework within which the study is
conducted. Section 3 presents an overview of the institutional structure and performance of the
banking system. It describes the relationship between the system's performance and the changes in the
underlying regulatory framework and economic environment from the 1950s to the present. Section
4 describes the short-run and medium-term impact of existing monetary, credit and banking policies.
Finally, the last section identifies and describes the expected impact and the legislative/administrative
measures required for the preferred components of monetary and banking policies supportive of agro-
industrial development.
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Over the past 20 years, ideas about the role of money and finance in economic development
have changed profoundly. The simple view that "money does not matter" has been replaced by the
more complex considerations of the role of finance in general, including the monetary and
nonmonetary financial instruments and functions(Long 1983). This development owes much to the
seminal works of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) that highlighted the adverse effect of financial
repression on economic growth. Their works have provided the intellectual underpinnings of much of
the policy prescriptions underlying financial sector analysis.
That money and finance matter is widely if not universally recognized. Money as a medium
of exchange promotes economic efficiency by eliminating much of the time spent in exchanging goods
and services. In a barter economy, trade requires a "mutual double coincidence of wants." Thus,
specialization is discouraged. Money facilitates specialization by reducing trading costs and linking
different markets. The other roles of money as unit of account and store of value serve the Same goal.
But as economies grow, and consequently the range of goods and services demanded, new institutional
arrangements and structures evolve to service the varied needs of different types of borrowers and
savers that only formal institutions -- commercial banks, investment houses and capital markets--
can supply.
Because of the central role of the financial system in the provision of payment services and
in economic growth, most governments have made control and regulation of money and the financial
system an important aspect of their development strategy. Historically, governments have controlled
the means of payment to guarantee its soundness and to collect seignorage i.e., the income from
the creation of money. Governments have also used control of money creation to influence the level
of economic activity, and control, allocation and pricing of credit to influence the composition of
investment. They have also intervened through various regulatory measures to ensure that financial
intermediaries behave prudently. These interventions are effected through the use of various
monetary policy instruments such as open market operations of the Central Bank, adjustments in the
reserve requirement and rediscount rate, as well as changes in various rules and regulations affecting
the operations of financial institutions. The latter include regulations related to single borrowers'
limit, capital adequacy ratios, bank entry and expansion requirements, among others.
Monetary policy affects the real economy through the level of interest rates and availability
of credit in the economy (Figure 1). Other things being the same, an expansionary monetary policy
reduces the level of interest rate, thereby inducing an increase in investment and growth in the economy.
The converse applies in the case ofcontractionary monetary policy. In the same manner, real variables
exert feedback effects ori the financial market through: (a)the "Fisher effect," (b) the effects of
consumption spending, investments and the financing of government expenditures on interest rates, and
(c) the effect of trade balance on domestic liquidity.
Financial intermediaries play a central role in this transmission process because of their
dual roles. First, they create money and administer the payment mechanism. Second, they mediate
between savers/lenders and investors/borrowers. On the one hand, they buy direct financial claims,
such as treasury bills, mortgages and loans from borrowers. On the other hand, they offer their own
indirect financial claims to lefiders/savers in the form of deposits in the case of banks. By specializing
in information gathering and portfolio management, financial intermediaries earn a return for
performing a function similar to that of a broker. Where there are no distortions in the financial market,
the yield on deposits are just equal to the rate of return of borrowers. However, where market
imperfections and other policy-imposed distortions exist, a wedge is driven between the gross cost of
borrowing and net return on lending. The ultimate effect of these distortions is to drive deposit rate
downwards and the lending rate upwards.
In many countries, financial repression i.e., the indiscriminatedistortionsoffinancialprices
including interest rates and foreign exchange rates, have reduced the real rate of growth and the real
size of the financial system relative to non-financial magnitudes. To this end, many countries have
made various changes in the structure and operations of their financial systems under the program
of liberalization or reforms. However, the experiences have been mixed. While the importance of an
efficient financial system is well recognized, the outcome of a financial liberalization program depends
to a large extent on the initial underlying institutional structure and the overall macroeconomic
condition of the economy.
Figure 1
•Transmissions of theimpact of Monetary Policy on the Real Sectors
I
MonetaryPolicy _--I InterestRates
iiib Consum_tI_-'n
Availabilityof I = ' 'Credit - Government
, =i,b Exp_r_Iturss .
ii,b Prlo'_s
BankingPollcles/ I Financial/Mariner_ --
Regulations i ..?-- Slructure
, E_0orts/Impozts
5The extent to which an efficient financial system can effectively contribute to development
is significantly limited by other complementary macroeconomic and sectoral policies such as trade,
investment, pricing policies and institutional structure. Protectionist trade regimes that undermine
comparative advantage may not work towards enhancing a country's development even if substantial
efforts for financial development are effected. In many countries that had to liberalize their foreign
trade sector, previously protected enterprises became significantly less profitable, contributing to the
nonperforming assets of financial institutions. In the same manner, highly indebted countries which
liberalized their financial sector way ahead of their real sectors experienced financial distress and
macroeconomic instability.
Thus, while f'mancial liberalization represents an important step towards enhancing economic
development, it is not sufficient. Moreover, as various country experiences indicate, financial
development entails more than de facto liberalization of interest rates. More fundamentally, unless
the underlying institutional structure_,.are in place, the perceived benefits may even turn out to be
destabilizing. These considerations need to be emphasized to put in proper perspective the role of
monetary and banking policies in development.
Ill. PHILIPPINE FINANCIAL SYSTEM:
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE
The Philippine financial system has undergone a significant transformation, both quantitative
and qualitative, since the 1950s. It started with 11 head offices and 75 branches of commercial
banks (KBs), and one savings bank (SB), Since then it has evolved more sophisticated and specialized
institutions. Between 1950 and 1960, the system was primarily composed of various types of banking
units dominated by KBs. In the 1970s, two major financialintermediaries emerged: non-bank financial
institutions (NBFIs)and non-bank thrift institutions (NBTIs). The former include investment houses,
financing companies, securities dealers, investment companies, fund managers, lending investors,
pawnshops, government non-bank financial institutions and venture capital corporations. The non-
bank thrift institutions, on the other hand, consist of mutual building and loan associations and non-
stock savings and loan associations. The banking system evolved into four major categories: KBs,
thrift banks (TBs), rural banks (RBs) and specialized government banks (SGBs).
While the share of the commercial banking system has declined over the years, it still
dominates the systemin terms of resource base. As of 1990, it accounted for 76 percent of the system's
resources, 87 percent of deposits, 73 percent of the system's total loan portfolio, and slightly more
than half of the capital accounts (Tables 1-4). This is despite the fact that its physical network comprises
• only 25 percent of the system's total network (Table 5).
During the period 1950-1990, the banking system exhibited reasonable but varying rates of
growth in total resources, loans, deposit and capital accounts (Table 6). Major developments in the
underlying regulatory framework and economic environment explain much of this varying perform-
ante. During the period 1950-1970, the system's total resources grew atan annual nominal rate of 15
percent. Deposits and capital accounts registered growth at 12 percent and 18 percent, respectively.
This trend" continued and peaked during the 1970s, when annual growth rates in the above variables
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Table 5. NUMBER AND DISTRIBUTION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
SELECTED YEARS
Item 1971 1975 1980 1985 1990
ALL 1668 3549 5057 57,80 7482
(Percentage Distribution)
Commercial Banks 4i .5 28.2 30.1 30.7 24.9
Thrift Banks 9.4 6.9 13.3 11.4 8.7
SpecializedGovernment
Banks 1.6 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.0
Rural Banks 33.3 23.1 21.7 19.3 14.0
Non-Bank Financial
Intermediaries 13.5 40.0 33.5 37.2 51.4
Source: 1990 Yearbook, Selected Philippine Economic
Indicators, Central Bank
Table 6. GRO_]HOFTNEPHIL]PPINE_]NA_C]ALSYSTEm,SELECTEDINDICATORS,I_ FORCE_
....................................................................................................................................................................................................
REGOUGCE5 : LOANPO_]FDLI8 _ GEPOSlIS : CAPITALACCOUNTS :
]ostitutiona] Groups 1950-70 I970-751975-GO ]980-G5 3985-?0:1950-70 3970-75 1975-80 3980-85 1995-90 _J950-70J970-75 ]975 80 19B0-85 ]9B5-90:]950-70 ]970-75 ]975-80 ]980-G5 i985-90
z_ _ z
BA_]_5 t_5TITUTiDN5 14.9 29.1 22.6 14.9 8.8 19.2 22.3 28.8 7.8 10._ 12.2 24.5 26.3 12.9 .]6.9 17.9 26.7 2J.1 ]J.3 ]3.6
KDs 13.5 30.$ 22.4 14.] 12.4 1_.7 23.2 2J.9 7.5 13.4 11.6 22.0 27.7 ]_._ 16.B i$_0 2D.b 25.5 13._ |_.6
T8 37.7 7.2 20.0 - 35.6 3,9 23.B 37.7 5.2 21.2 - - 32.9 6.] 22.3
POh - 33.5 2_.5 17.3 * 27.7 20.3 18.6 - 29.? 28.3 ]7.9 - * 2B.B 18.? 20.2
SHOS _B.? i1.6l 26.2 - 37.5 (3.5} 32.0 3B.7 (1.7) 25.e - 33.1 [B.Ot 38.0
$SLAs 37.3 J4,7 7.1 - 32.3 8.6 6.] 38.8 12,5 8,9 : 37.0 ]2.1 5.5
99S 34.2l 33.21 ]5.0 9.2 %4 34.01 34._ 14.5 7.0 1.6 46.41 33.J 20.2 12.2 19.4 27.74 13.5 ]2.] 12.5 10.9
SGBs 23.1, 20.7 113.9_: * 26.4 10.3 110.5) ]0.1 ! J2.0 _ 12.4 5.4 11.9
SavJnqs8aoks 24.2 14._ _ 24.0 15.3 2_.1 16.2 - 23.0 14.2 •
Deve]opu_t Banks 12,4I 25.4 - 12.21 12.? 81.61i 6].2 - 5.0 27o8
Postal SavJnOsBan_s 5.1 (b.O) - - 3.3 (23.7) - 12.b 10.5 -
:NON-SANKFIh'P.NCIALINTER- _,
:RED|ARIES - I7.0 7.8 6.5 32.1 9.2 {1.0}: " , - - _ - - 12.l ]2.1 ]].0
:NON=B_N_INR]FT iNSTI-
:TUIIO_S 23._ 22.1 40.8 2_.9 2],6 42.6 * 34.9 34.9 (_.1): - - 22.1 18,1 4_.3
r
, ||
:ALL 14.9 22.] 2_.9 14.0 9.7 ]9.2 22.3 24.0 8.0 _.3 X2.2 24,5 26.3 12.9 lA.9 : 17.9 2&.7 lB.3 11.6 13.5
......................................______......._...................................................- ..........................................._ .........................
I 1255_1970on]y.
$[ 1960-1970 only.
12
exceeded 20 percent. The serious financial crises in the 1980s resulted in the contraction of the banking
system's resource base.
The period 1950-1970 was characterized as a period of dynamic and rapid growth in banking
•as the number of banking units quadrupled in response to various banking legislations. These included
the enactment of the Rural Banks Act in 1952 (RA 720), the enactment of the Development Bank of
the Philippines Charter in 1958 (RA 2081), the Law on Secrecy of Deposits enacted in September
1955, and the Philippine Deposit and Insurance Corporation Act, among others. With these
developments, bank supervision and examination focused on the licensing of new banking units and
branch operations. Minimum initial capital Was not enforced except as a precondition to.the availment
of the CB rediscount window. Monitoring and examination of bank operations were confined to the
basics: solvency compliance with the 15 percent risk-asset ratio; liquidity through compliance with
the required reserves; and review of financial condition and operations results through reports
submitted. A substantial part of )ank examination was the Validation of balances and review of
creditworthiness of bank borrowerL The period also saw the early beginnings of conflict-of-interest
control through the regulation on loans against personal security and DOSR/loans (Valenzuela 1989).
By 1970, the rapid expansion in the banking system raised concern that the financial system
had become unnecessarily complicated and fragmented. Moreover the emergence of new forms of
financial intermediaries challenged the effectiveness of CB regulation and'supervision of the system.
This paved the way for the adoption of reform measures recommended by the 1971 Joint IMF-CBP
Banking Survey Commission. The Commission was created specifically to review the overall system
and recommend changes in its structure and operations to guide its future growth. Based on the
commission's findings and recommendations, amendments were made to the,General Banking Act and
the Central Bank Act in 1972-1973. These included the alignment of legalprovisions and regulations
by functional areas rather than by type of banks, the consolidation of CB authority over banks and non-
banks (except insurance companies), a redefinition of CB's responsibilities to exclude the promotion
of economic growth, which Was to be a primary responsibility of government planning agencies, and
the imposition of restrictions On entry of newbanks in the system, with corresponding efforts to improve
the efficiency of existing banks. These goals were pursued through several programs of action.
The 1970s were also marked by a shift towards a more interventionist monetary and credit
policy. In support of the government's rural development thrust, an expansionary monetary policy and
other selective credit mechanisms were implemented. These included the Agri-Agra Law, the deposit
retention scheme, provision of low-cost Special Time Deposits (STDs), as well as interest ceilings on
deposits, loans and rediscounts. The CB took on an expanded developmental banking function, from
• designing lending programs to overseeing their subsequent implementation and funding through the
rediscount window. In effect, the CB's rediscount window assumed a largely aUocative function
whose adverse effects are now widely known.
• In particular, liberal access to the rediseounting of the CB fostered dependence and undermined
f'u_aneial.intermediation. The RB system became a mere conduit of cheap government funds
performing little deposit mobilization and judicious management of loan portfolio, Hence, when loan
arrearages began to mount towards the late 1970s and access to the rediscount window turned
restrictive, many RBs became insolvent. This necessitated a special rehabilitation program which
proved largely ineffective in addressing the underlying structural weaknesses of the system.
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Despite the deterioration in the general maeroeconomic conditions and the adverse effects
of repressive financial market policies, the banking system continued to post real growth until 1983
(Figures 2-5). This period was also marked by the implementation of important institutional and
policy reforms in the banking system. Following the recommendation of the 1979 financial sector
review, the CB in 1980 adopted the modified universal banking concept which enabled KBs to engage
in near- banking functions. As a complementary measure, a dramatic shift in interest rate policy was
adopted. Starting in 1980, ceilings on various categories of savings and time deposits and loans of over
two-year maturities were lifted. By January 1, 1983, deregulation was completed with the removal
of the remaining interest rate ceilings on short-tenn loans.
In the face of all these reform measures, the Philippine financial system suffered a serious
setback in 1981 in the wake of Dewey Dee's flight from the country, leaving behind debts running
into millions of pesos. Although the accumulated debts comprised only a small proportion of the
financial system's assets, the default triggered insolvencies on investment houses and finance
companies which had significant exposures on him. Major KB s benefitted from the crisis as depositors
of non-bank financial institutions shifted their funds to the system perceived to be relatively safer.
Because of the potentially destabilizing impact on the financial system, the CB undertook a major
liquidity infusion by establishing the Industrial Rehabilitation Fund and the Stock Financing
Program (Valenzuela 1989). Additional measures to strengthen the market were adopted, including a
' more careful evaluation of credit worthiness, delimitation of commercial paper issues to prime papers
and prime issuers, and regulations on trust operations and fund management aimed at differentiating
between the two.
The period 1983-1985 was the most challenging for the monetary authorities and the financial
system. The gradualloss of confidence in the Philippine economy accelarated with the political events
of 1983. Faced with massive capital flight, a persistent imbalance in the external current account
position and severe foreign exchange deficits, the government introduced a rationing system for
foreign exchange and imposed a moratorium on capital repayments abroad. This move weakened the
confidence of the country's creditors and led to the withdrawal of supplier's credit. To stem the flight
of capital, monetary authorities implemented a tight monetary policy that saw interest rates on loans
and CB bills soaring from 14.5 percent per annum before the start of the crisis in 1983 to as high as 40
percent in 1984. The move was a virtual attack on the financial system as banks were besieged with
pretermination of deposit accounts in favor of high-yielding CB bills which, given their relative yield
and credit risk, were more attractive investment by banks and big depositors. This resulted in the
crowding out of loans and a corresponding shift in bank portfolio towards these bills. Between
1984 and 1985, outstanding loans of the banking sector fell by 17 percent. Other complementary
measures undertaken during the period was the devaluation of the exchange rate from P 11 to P 18 per
$1. Inflation increased from 10 percent per annum in 1982 to a high of 50.3 percent in 1984. As a
result, the economy contracted to its pre-1980 level, with GNP posting negative growth rate of seven
percent in real terms. Similarly, the current account deficit contracted sharply from its previous level
of 8.41 percent of GNP in 1983 to 0.34 percent of GNP in 1985.
In response to'the situation, the CB continued the rationalization and review of its existing
banking regulations. New monetary instruments were introduced in 1983 and 1984 to address
monetary stability. These included the blocking of swap differentials and blocked peso deposits. The
blocking of swap differentials was introduced to dampen the expansionary impact of losses that CB
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incurred in swap arrangements. Under the swap transaction, the CB simultaneously engaged in a spot
purchase of a foreign currency' at the prevailing rate and a future sale of the same currency at a
predetermined forward rate. Losses were incurred as a result of the series of peso depreciation, which
led to a higher actual rate than the forward cover. Instead of remitting these swap differentials to the
banks, the CB blocked their release and placed them in an interest-earning deposit account.
On the other hand, under blocked peso deposit transactions, the CB required local borrowers
of Paris Club creditors to deposit the peso equivalent of their outstanding foreign loans on original
maturity dates. These peso deposits were placedin non-interest-bearing blocked accounts and provided
foreign exchange cover by the CB. Blocking these deposits sterilized the pesos which would have
been used to buy foreign exchange to pay the maturing obligations.
IV. IMPACT OF EXISTING MONETARY, CREDIT AND BANKING POLICIES
With the change in government in 1986, monetary, credit and banking reforms initiated earlier
gained momentum. These reforms embodied in the 1986-92 Medium Term Development Plan seek
to strengthen the monetary and regulatory functions of the CB and enhance the efficiency of the
financial system. They are categorized into policy and institutional reforms, with some of the former
being ongoing concerns. Thus, a full accounting of their net effects and the possibility of substantial
lag effects preclude full analysis at present. Hence, the discussions of the impact should be taken as
indicative. For a better appreciation of the issues, a summary of the expected short- and medium-term
impact of the various policies is presented in Table 7.
A. Policy Reforms
1. Interest Rate Policy
Interest rates on deposits and loans of various maturities and rediscounts have been largely
market-determined since 1983. In addition, auniformrediscountrate aligned with the market rate now
applies. Itis based on the Manila Reference Rate (MRR) 90 which is a weighted average of the interest
rates on promissory notes and time deposits with a 90-day maturity. The rate is regularly re-evaluated
and, if necessary, adjusted quarterly. From a largely allocative function, the CB rediseount window
now performs a liquidity function. Prior to deregulation of interest rates, banks circumvented the ceiling
by passing it on as additional charges and fees.
The Philippine experience in financial liberalization indicates mixed results. Following
deregulation, interest rates on loans and deposits increased. The higher interest rates on deposits and
borrowed funds, induced by the financial reforms and the low returns on loans and investment carried
over by the period of repressed interest rates, combined to put a squeeze on bank profits. This made
banks more vulnerable to the balance-of-payment crisis that contributed to financial stress. Moreover,
the increase in interest rates on new loans contracted during the crisis period was not enough to
compensate for the loss incurred on medium-and long-term loans contracted in the previous period, not
to mention losses due to numerous defaults (Remolona and Lamberte 1986).
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Table 7 Short- and Medium-Term Impact of Existing Monetary, Credit and Banking Policies
Policy Shert-Run Impact Long-Run Impa_
1. Interest rate deregulation Increase In Interestrate with the Greater transparency and deepeningof
liftingof oontrols the fir_nctal marketbecause of:
Increasedsavingsmobilization/Increased
incentiveto investinfinancial assets,
reductionof non-pricecredit rationing
improvedbank Intermedlatlonand
efficiency,betterportlolloreturnand
risk
improvedeconomicefficiencythrough
the quantitybut also throughthe
quality and productivityof Investments
2, Overvaluedexchange rate Distortsrelativepricesand Underminesthe developmentof the
penalizesthe exportsector export sector
Consequenthighand volatileInterest
rates _lne the developmentof
capitalmarket
3. Highreserve requirement High Interestrate to end.users Underdevelopment/centractlonol the
due to inereasedIntermedlatlon real siZeo/the bankingsystem,This
cost of banks hasunfavorableeffecton economic
growthvia the quantityInvestment.
Lower intermedlationlevel
4. Gross receipttax IncreaseIn bank's_ o_ lanc=ng Affectseconom_ growth via quantilyof
resulting inhigher berrowlngcost investments
Increase inoff-balance sheetactivities
of banks
5, Agd-agra Increase Inbanks' costot lan_ng Distortsbanks' Joanportfoliowhich
resultingIn higherborrowing¢x_t resultsIn allocative Inefficiency.
6. Del:X_itretentionsdleme Higher borrowingcost Affectsthe qualityof banks' portfolio
and hencebanking atflolency.
7, Witholdingtax on Inlem_ Reducesbanks' return Makes monitoringof the benklngsystem
income moredlffloultto the extentthat bank
Disincentiveon try to clrcumvemIt byInvesitng
savings excessfuRdsIntaxexempt Instruments
regardlessof actual liquidityneeds,
2O
Table 7 continued
II. Institutionalreforms
8, Transfer of CB's management Greater focusand atlentlon on Contrlbutasto more stable financial
of special lendingprograms CB's traditionalstablllzstlon system
functionand closersupervisionof
the bankingsystem.
Removes the burden of carrying
presentand future losses of these
programsfromItsbooks.
9. BankeupewIslon and.
regulation
9,1 Expandedcoverage of Single Minimizesdskexposureof banks More stablebankingsystem
Borrower'sLimit
Prevents/minimizesInsiderabuse
9.2 DOSRI MinimizesInsiderabuse and More stable bankingsystem
conflict-of-interest
9.3 Expandedaudit and reporting Earlydetectionof possible More stable banking system
requirement violations
StrengthensCB's supervisory
function
9.4 Highercapitalization Enablesbanks to generate more More stable bankingsystem
requirement volumeof business
Enhancesbank stability
9.5 Liberalizedbank entryand Improvedaccessto bankingsecvloss Developmentof the financial market
Expansion because ol enhanced competidon and
efficiencyof the 10anklngsystem
10. Strengtheningof the PDIC Enhanceddepositors'confidencein More stable bankingsystem
the banking.system
11. Rehabilitation ana eventual Restore financial vlabllllyof PNt:3 £)eve.l_nt ct market for long-term
•prlvatlzatlonof DBP and PNB and DBP to reduce continued paper
budgetarylossesof NG and make
them attractivefor pdvstlzatlon RedUcegovemmentparticipationInthe
bankingsystem
12. RehablUtationof rural banks StrengthensRBs to resume lending Developmentof a leaner butflnandally
to ruralareas vlablaruralfinancialsystem
13. Phase-outand consofldstlon Reducedistortionand financial More efficientmanagementofcredit
of agrloultoralcredlt lossesfromsubsldlzedoperations programs
programsIntothe cALF bynonflnsnclalgovernment
institution Enhancefinancialdisctpllneof
bo_re
Induce bank lendingto agflculture
throughthe reductionof k)rldlngdsk
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Within the RB syste m, a significant segment was able to respond, adjust and perform
satisfactorily under the new financial environment. For the majority, deregulation of interest rates
improved their intermediationlevels and enhanced theircompetitive efficiency in terms of narrowing
differential interest spreads. The liberalization also stabilized their portfolio returns and risk. The
risk-efficient portfolios of RBs were found to have better diversified portfolio between loans and non-
loan assets, with lower exposure to high-risk agricultural loans and higher deposit mobilization after
deregulation (Corales 1990). Since the change in the rediscounting policy of the CB, RBs have
increasingly relied on deposits as shown by the consistent rise in their deposits (Table 6). This despite
the fact that many RBs were closed by the CB after 1986.
However, while deregulation of interest rates has provided greater yield to financial savers, it
has been argued thatit was not strongly associated with increases in the real savings deposit liabilities
of RBs in the rural areas. More than the interest rate, real income was found to have significantly
influenced real savings deposit (Quifiones 1990).
Note, however, that while interest rates are not regulated, the structure of interest rates belies
claims that the underlying market structure is competitive. Very large differentials exist between types
of deposits and types of loans, and between lending rates of banks and the rediscount rate of the CB.
In 1990, the interest differential between savings deposits and lending rates on secured loans for all
maturities was about 19 percent. On the other hand, the.corresponding interest differential between time
deposits and secured loans was four percent, while that between the rediscounta'ate and time deposit was
six percent.
Tan (1989) observed that these differentials were much higher than in other Asian countries.
She argued that these were probably the result of price (interest rate) discrimination behavior of big
banks under a monopolistic banking structure. Banks are likely to discriminate between two
distinguishable groups of depositors -- the small, less-informed surplus units and the affluent and
financially sophisticated surplus units with more elastic supply of funds. The differential between
rediscount rate and bank deposits has important implications for financial development. Since banks
blend their funds, the actual gross margin that banks realize is actually much higl_er than the simple
difference between the two rates. This subsidy element deserves appropriate attention by the CB.
It transmits a potentially distorted signal by encouraging banks to source their funds from the
rediscounting window, instead of mobilizing deposits from the public. It has also been pointed out that
banks can take advantage of this differential to profit out of CB operations (San Jose 1990). A
rediscount rate that is lower than CB's open market instruments could induce banks to borrow from
the rediscount facility and invest in government securities, thereby making a profit.
Over the long haul, deregulation is expected to bring about more transparency in the system and
the eventual deepening of the financial market. Accumulated evidence indicates that financial
repression results in the underdevelopment of the financial market. Under a regime of interest rate
controls, depositors have no incentive to invest in financial assets since their value deteriorates with
inflation. Surplus units would rather prefer to invest in real properties and other inflation hedges which
appreciate in value. With lower intermediation, the rate of investment in the economy is reduced,
thereby stifling economic growth. Interest rate controls also affect economic efficiency through the
quantity, quality, and productivity of investments, as projects with low rates of return are made
artificially viable by the ceiling. These compete and crowd out other higher-yielding projects.
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Countries with positive real interest taros had considerably higher rates of growth than those of
the others (Table 8). Their overall output grew almost three times faster on the average than in
countries with negative rates. However, many of the countries with positive real interest rates had
more stable macroeconomic policies and more open trading systems which contributed to their high
growth rates.
2. Exchange Rate'Policy
In managing the exchange rate, the CB has followed an "independent float" system since
1984. The scheme allows KBs under the jurisdiction of the Bankers Association of the Philippines
(BAP) to trade among themselves. However, the CB from time to time acts as an active buyer or seller
on the trading floor to prevent wide fluctuations in the exchange rate. Invariably, in the face of
persistent imbalance in the trade account, the CB hasresorted to the use ofinterestrate policy to defend
the value of the domestic currency. This has contributed to high and volatile movements in interest
rates, and is viewed as an implicit penalty or tax on exporters because the resulting overvaluation of
the currency makes Philippine exports more expensive.
The policy has also serious implications for financial market development. High domestic
interest rates translate into high inflation and erodes the real value of financial assets, leading to lower
levels of intermediation. On the other hand, volatile movements in interest rates discourage savers
from investing in long-term deposit instruments-or Securities. As a result, banks have found it hard
to mobilize and consequently lend term funds. Term transformation has not• been accomplished to
a significant degree because banks have been unwilling to assume liquidity risk. This has resulted in
a situation where the main sources of medium- and long-term financing have been government-
directed credit programs, i.e., the Industrial Guarantee and Loan Fund (IGLF) and Apex Financing
Program for Industry, and the Agricultural Loan Fund (ALF)/Countryside Loan Fund (CLF) for
•agriculture.
3. Monetary Management
As part of its monetary instruments, the CB every now and then makes adjustments on the
reserve ratio to influence the levelofmoney supply. Although reserve requirements across bank types
have become more standardized, reserve requirements have been on the uptrend. Since 1986, required
reserves have been adjusted several times from both directions. By the end of •1990, reserve
requirement for KBs reached their high point of 25 percent. Nonetheless, RBs and TBs continue
to receive preferential treatment vis-a-vis KBs (Table 9). This preferential treatment aims to offset
the continued flow of financial resources from the rural areas to the urban areas, and the high cost
of lending to the rural sector as a result of risk and high administrative cost. Despite such measure,
formal lending to agriculture and rural enterprises has remained low. Moreover, outflow of•funds
from the rural sector has persisted. Thus it is debatable if f'mancial market instruments are the
approriate mechanisms for addressing project risks which are non-financial in origin.
The adoption of a high reserve requirement as the CB's principal tool for monetary
management deserves qualification, because of the trade-off between the need to stabilize the
economy and the effects on bank intermediation cost. Aside• from being blunt monetary instruments,
reserve requirements are an implicit tax on financial intermediation. The tax arises because of the
Table 8. GROWTH RATES AND OTHER ECONOMIC INDICATORSFOR COUNTRY GROUPS WtTH POSITIVE
MODERATELY NEGATIVE AND STRONGLY NEGATWE REAL INTEREST RATES
1965-73AND 1974-85,AVERAGE PERCENT
1965-73 1974-85
Negative Negative
Indicator Positive Moderately Strongly Positive Moderately Strongly
Real InterestRate 3.7 -3.7 -13.7 3.0 -2.4 -13.0
GDPGrowth Rate 7.3 5.5 4.6 5.6 3.8 1.9
M3/GDP 28.9 27.0 29.1 40.3 34.0 30.5
Investment]GDP 21.4 19.7 21.4 26.9 23.2 23.0
ChangetnGDPtlnvestment 36.7 31.! 21.7 22.7 17.3 6.2
Change!nReal M31RealSaving 18.7 12.7 6.4 16.6 8.2 -0.9
IntlationRate_ 22.2 7.1 40.2 20.8 23.9 50.3
V01atiiityof InflationRate 17.1 5.3 27.2 12.2 9.1 23.5
...... ,._.L.,_.._m_..._.-...................................................................................................................................
Note_.Real interestrateswere Calculatedfromnominalratesaccordingto the following
formula:[(l+r)/(l+p)-l]x 100, where r isthedeposit rateandp is the inflation
rate. Inflationis the percentagechangeinthe consumerpriceindex (CPI). M3 is
currencyplusthe sum of non-bank deposits of the publicat all identified
deposit-takinginstitutions. Real saving is gross domestic savingsdeflated by
the:_vei'ageannual CPI rate. Volatility of inflation is the absolutedeviation of
the inflationrate from its level the year before. Source:Gelb (Background Paper).
Source: WorldDevelopment Report, 1989.
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Table9. YEAR-END RESERVE REQUIREMENT RATIOS ON DEPOSITS AND DEPOSIT SUBSTITUTES, BY BANK TYPE
...............................................................................................................................................................................................
TIME DEPOSITS DEPOSIT SUBSTITUTES
NOW ..... -...................................................................
CIRCULAR NO./DATE YEAR DEMAND SAVINGS ACCOUNT._ <730 days >730 days <730 days >730 days
............ J. .....................................................................................................................................................................
A. COMMERCIAL BANKS
752/August22, 1980 1980 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
782/February27_1981 1981 16 16 16 16 5 18 18
908/December 29, 1982 t982 18 18 18 18 l 18 18
945/October1, 1983 1983 18 18 18 18 5 20 18
100?JApnl17, 1984 1984 24 24 24 24 6 24 6
1079IOctober8, 1985 1985 23 23 28 23 6 24 6
1122/November28, 1986 1986 21 21 21 21 5 21 5
1987 21 21 21 21 5 21 5
1988 21 21 21 21 5 21 5
12091November5, 1989 1989 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
1269/December28, 1990 1990 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
1991 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
B.THRIFT BANKS
752/August22, 1980 1980 20 8 12 8 8 20 20
782/February 27, 1981 1981 16 8 12 8 5 18 18
908/December29, 1982 1982 18 8, 12 8 1 18 18
945/October1, 1983 1983 18 8 12 8 5 20 18
1002/April17, 1984 1984 24 14 18 14 6 24 6
1079/October3, 1985 1985 24 14 18 14 6 23 6
1122/November28, 1986 1986 21 14 18 14 5 21 5
1987 21 14 18 14 5 21 5
1988 21 14 18 14 5 21 5
12091November5, 1989 1989 20 14 18 14 _O 20 20
1269/December28, 1990 1990 23 17 23 17 21 23 23
1991 25 19 25 19 23 25 25
C. RURAL BANKS
752/December31, 1980 1980 15.5 8 12 8 8
752/September30, 1981 1981 20 8 12 8 8
782/January 1, 1982 1982 16 8 12 8 5
945/October1, 1983 1983 16 8 12 8 5
1002/Aprg17, 1984 1984 22 14 18 14 6
1985 22 14 18 14 6
1122/November28, 1986 1986 21 14 18 14 5
1987 21 t4 18 14 5
1988 21 14 18 14 5
12091November5, 1989 1989 20 14 18 20 20
1261INovember30, 1990 1990 23 14 23 14 14
1991 23 14 23 14 14
.................................................................................................................................................................................................
a/RBs have nodepositsubstitutes.
Source:VariousCentralBank CircuJars.
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reduction in loanable funds that is available to banks and the low remuneration (4%) paid on these
reserves which is much lower than the market interest rate. Since banks have to pay interest on their
deposit liabilities, banks recoup the foregone income on the reserves by increasing their lending rates.
It must be qualified that while the CB has two other monetary policy instruments at its
disposal, namely the discount rate and open market operations, their use is hampered by limitations
on their efficacy in achieving the desired level of monetary targets and by the associated implications
for CB's income position. In the case of the discount rate, while CB sets the rate and terms of access
to the discount window, borrowing is initiated by banks and is therefore under their direct control.
In the case of open market operations, the market for government securities is thin, largely
confined to 18 or so accredited dealers. More importantly, however, CB is severely constrained in
issuing its own bill as this would significantly increase its already huge accumulated losses. Instead,
what has actually been done is for the national government (NG) to issue Treasury Bills (T-bills) in
excess of its funding requirements and deposit the excess with CB to enable the latter to conduct
monetary policy. These considerations have left CB with reserve requirements as its only effective
tool with which to conduct monetary policy.
4. Taxation of Financial Intermediaries and Depositors
Another important factor that affects the development of the financial sector is the fiscal or tax
regime and incentives imposed on financial intermediaries. Like many countries, the Philippines
collects special taxes from financial intermediaries. The most important of these are the gross receipt
tax (GRT) and the implicit tax in the form of reserve requirement ratio which was already discussed
earlier. On the depositor side, a 20 percent tax levied on income from deposits also increases the
intermediation cost.
The GRT is imposed on all receipts of a bank. Formerly applied at a uniform rate, it is now
imposed on a sliding scale, with a rate of five percent for instruments of less than two years maturity.
Since the GRT is directly related to interest income, it is not a stable source of revenue because it is
subject to fluctuations in interest rate. As with the reserve requirement, the GRT increases the cost of
intermediation which is passed on to borrowers in the form of higher lending rates. In addition, the
imposition of the GRT also causes distortions in the financial system. It is suspected that efforts
of banks at evading this have led to an increase in trust accounts in an attempt to undertake normal
banking functions on an off-balance sheet basis (World Bank 1988). Trust account activities in turn
have important effects on the banking system, in particular, the KB system because of their effects on
bank solvency and liquidity (Zingapan et al. 1990).
The agri-agra lending requirement is another implici t tax on intermediation. The law mandates
banks to set aside 25 percent of their loan portfolio to agriculturallending. Out of this, 10 percent should
be alloted for agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs) andthe other 15 percent for general agricultural
lending. Because of the liberal coverage of what is considered as agricultural, banks have generally
complied with this. However, for the agra component, compliance has_been largely through the
purchase of reserve eligible government securities which are paid belo w market rates, To recover the
opportunity cost banks pass this on to borrowers.
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Another implicit tax is the requiredloans-to-cleposit ratio or the deposit retention scheme. The
scheme requires banks to investin the same regional grouping at least 75 percent of their total deposits
net of required reserves and provision for til! money. Although some relaxation in the implementation
of this scheme has been effected since 1988, the provision contains a distortion since it narrows the
area by which banks can lend. Such restriction prevents banks from exploiting better investment
opportunities which may not be available in the same geographical area. This affects the quality of their :
portfolio and the cost of their operations, and is translated into higher borrowing cost.
Finally, a witholding tax on deposit interest income, which is levied at the rate of 20 percent,
also creates distortions. Although it is a credit against income tax, it is not refundable if the computed
income tax liability falls short of the amount withheld. Since banks are often in a position where
their computed income tax liability is less than the witholding tax collected from them, this causes
distortions. Given that the tax is applicable to interbank deposits with maturity of more than seven days,
banks evade this by investing their excess funds in short-term deposits of less than seven days on at
roll-over basis, regardless of their actual liquidity needs. Such practice makes monitoring of the
banking system more difficult to the extent that it might lead to overstatement of actual liquidity in
the system (World Bank 1988).
Despite vigorous objections, their repeal or abolition has yet to be effected. On the contrary,
a similar loan quota provision made its way in a recently enacted law, the Magna Carta for Small
Enterprises (R.A. 6977). Among other things, R.A. 6977 mandates banks to set aside at least five
percent of their loan portfolio to small enterprises by the end of the first year of the effectivity of
the law, 10 percent from the second to the fifth year, five percent on the sixth year and declining
thereafter.
In general, these taxes have led to high intermediation margins and costs among Philippine
banks. World Bank estimates indicate an average intermediation cost (AIC) of 7-10 percent during
1983-86. An analysis of the components of this cost showed that in 1986, intermediation taxes ( 20%
Final Tax and GRT) comprised 25 percent of average intermediation cost. Reserves and agri-agra
compliance, on the other hand, contributed about 20 percent of AIC (Table 10). Given the negative
impact of these instruments on the financial system, there is a strong case for their immediate repeal
or phase-out.
B. Institutional Reforms
A number of important institutional reforms in the financial system have been implemented
since 1986. Some of these reforms were aimed at increasing the efficiency of the financial system
in general, while others were sector-specific. These reforms undertaken by the executive branch
of the government are discussed in the following section.
1. Role of the Central Bank in Credit Allocation
The CB performed its allocative function through itsrediscount window and the management
of special lending programs for agriculture and industry. Starting in 1986, substantial progress was
made in moving the CB out of developmental banking into its traditional role of monetary
management. With the creation of the Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC) and the
Table 10. COMPONENTS OF THE AVERAGE INTERMEDIATION COST (AiC)
1983-1986, IN PERCENT
Item 1983 1984 1985 1986
TAXES 2.75 3.59 3.13 2.19
20% Final Tax 2.00 2.60 2.19 1.46
5% Gross ReceiptsTax 0.75 0.99 0.94 0.73
RESERVESAND AGRI-AGRA 2.65 3.82 3.02 1.60
BANK MARGIN 1.59 1.90 3.92 4.97
TOTAL 6.99 9.31 10.07 8.76
Source: World Bank FinancialSector Review, 1988.
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Comprehensive Agricultural Loan Fund (CALF)in 1986, most of the agricultural lending programs
implemented by the Department of Agriculture were consolidated into the CALF. Other programs
transferred were the Agricultural Loan Fund (ALF) to the LBP, the Apex Financing Program (APEX)
and the Industrial Guarantee and Loan Fund (IGLF) to the DBP.
This move was in the right direction. With the gradual transfer of these programs to other
government financial institutions (GFIs), the CB is freed of these functions and enabled to deploy
additional personnel to attend to other functions. This allows the CB to focus on its more fundamental
mandate of providing timely examination and closer supervision of the banking system. Over the long
haul, this is expected to contribute to a more stable financial system by enabling early detection of
fraud and insider abuse, which have been identified as the main causes of the rash of bank failures in
the recent past.
2. The CB's Role in Bank Supervision and Regulation
Likewise, major initiatives and reforms have been implemented to strengthen the CB's
supervision and regulation of the banking system. These were deemed necessary in the light of the
numerous bank failures andfinancial stresses during the 1980s. Changes effected in these areas covered
the following: (a) policies on prudential banking'restrictions; (b) imposition of penalties and sanctions;
(c) supervisory procedures; and (d) policies on the establishment of new banks and branches. Policies
affecting prudential bank management include, among others, minimum capitalization requirement,
compliance with the minimum risk-asset ratio, the single borrower's limit (SBL), limits on loans to
directors, officers, stockholders and related interests (DOSRI), allowable interlocking directorships
and officerships, and provisions for loan loss or doubtful accounts.
Table 11 summarizes the various changes in banking regulations from 1986 to 1991. Some
of the more significant changes are discussed below.
Single Borrower's Limit. In the wake of several bank failures, the CB instituted a number
of measures to strengthen the banking system. One of these measures was the expansion of the
coverage of the single borrower's limit. The new provision requires the inclusion of contingent
liabilities in determining the limit to which banks can lend to a single borrower or a group of affiliated
borrowers. The regulation limits the aggregate ceiling of guarantee oustanding to 50 percent of a
bank's unimpaired capital and surplus standby letters of credit, foreign and domestic, including
guarantees except those fully secured by cash, hold-out deposit/deposit substitutes or government
securities. For NBFIs, the ceiling must not exceed 50 percent of their net worth. These changes were
instituted to prevent insider abuse, which was one of the major causes of bank failures, and to protect
banks, particularly government banks, which in the past
had overextended lending to politically favored groups.
DOSRI Loans Directorship. To closely monitor loans to directors, officers,
stockholders and related interests (DOSRI), the CB requires that loan documents include a
depositor's waiver of his right under the existing law of confidentiality of deposits, in case he obtains
a loan secured by hold-outs or assignment of deposits. Complementary regulations on interlocking
directorships and officerships were also instituted. Under the revised rules, no concurrent
directorships or officerships of a bank and an NBFI or of two banks in which majority interest is
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Table 11: SIIIOiARYOFCHAHGKSIi _JYIALBAll IIIGULATIOJJS,1986-1991
Circular He. •Kffecttvity Pate $1pervisi_teol Derspiation
1093 |e5. 26, 1986 bnirinl no to poet within their
premisesa _ of their, qurterly
Statemut of Cmditka._
1104 Bay26, 1986 Red_iq. required reserve fern
2_3Zto 22 Z e_aiest
Us: dtmi deposit
savi_ deposit
UOIeccoute
tim deposit (730 d_vs oe
leas)
deposit su58titutes (730
•de_eor less)
1_e: demmldeposit
deposit substitutes (730.
deys or lese)
NDlqe:deposit substitute. (730
days or less)
1112 Awfut 4, 1906 .ledaciM further the required
reserves frsn 2_ .te 21Xfor the
sane aecouts stated in Circular
110,4
II13 AMMt 14, 1986 [_ohibitiM I_e to tediscout
•loans punted fern _ial Yke
kpouito (me) provided bl the
•iovet_meut, for the _layan sa
L_uI_.nh_pm. •
1114 Septoeber l, 1986 _ttiq timeloan val_:_f. 80I end
,,t_dj_out rate of IL._ p.a. _or
the Mi_osat f_ilitl.of the
foe elifible papers in iqp'i_altural
peodaetiel, cottole end Rail
inhstriee emiit,.,_weai purpose
mrkiM r.Qit_l fimm_ia8 and other
shoat-tom _eedlto.
3O
CircularNo. Effectivity Date Supervision/Control Deregulation
1115 September[6, 1988 Prohibiting concurrent officershipo
betweenbanksor betweena bank and
a non-bankfinancial intermediary
except with prior approval of the
MonetaryBoard.
1119 October18.19B6 Requiringall banking institutions.
including banks with expanded
conercial banking authority to
maintaina 21Z reserveagainst
depositsubstituteliabilitieswith
originalmaturitiesof 730days or
less,exceptshort-termborrowings
frombanksand non-bankfinancial
institutionsforwhichthe reserve
requireMntshallbe IX. a 6%
reserveagainstdepositsubstitute
liabilitieswithoriginalmaturities
of more than730 daysfor NBQBs
shallalsobemaintained.
1122 November23,1986 Reducingthe requiredreserves
for time deposits from 6_ to 5%
for all bankinginstitutions
li.e.,KBs,Thriftbanks,RBs)
andnon-banksfinancialinterme-
diaries. Likewise, required
reserves against deposit
substituteliabilitieswith
originalmaturitiesofmore the
730 daysisreducedfrom6% to
5%.
i123 December5,[986 Providesfor theinclusioninthe
determinationof the slngle
borrower'sloanlimitunder_ection
23 of R.A. 337 the outstanding
foreiguand domesticstandbyand
deferredlettersof credit less
marginaldepositsand outstanding
guarantees,except those fully
securedby cash, hold-outon
deposits/depositsubstituteor
governmentsecurities.Likewise,
aggregateceiling'on issuanceof
guaranteesi providedwherebya
bankmaynot issue morethan 50% of
its unimpairedcapitaland surplus
standbylettersof creditforeign
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Circular No. Iffectivity Date Supeevisiou/CoatrcL, krenLatiou
and doeastie, iaelediH..detesters,
except these filll Neared by ¢uh,
held-out ol del_ito/depoeit ouheti-
tute8 or:soveememtseverities, For
N_,. it nest sot exceed 50Z of
their setwrth,
1124 December5, 1986 _riq each bask. to. case an
ennal, financial mdit to be
con_cted h; as external Ladepondeet
auditor not Later thee,,30days after
the close of the oaleJae year and
reports of mh _[it shall be
_itted to the _ aot Later then
90 days after .the star_ of the
audit.
1125 I_emher IS, 1986 Ik_ei_ the rediscount_rate to
IOZ p.a. frm ]l.TSg p.a. ks
previo_ll prceided ie Circular
1114 for the sane eltdtble
papers.
1133 lebmat_ 9,.L987 _eptious from lelal reserve
reqliremnt special tie deposits
and deposit sebstitutes arisint
free the Lending operatiOne of-
IGL|and.ALe,
1135 Feb_ 23, 1987 _iriq the ludi_ beth to keep a
complete record of aLl pertinelt
Ion docmentethick shall be
avaiLabLe for impoetion and/or
•eaeaiutiou by the _
1143 April 24, 1987 Setting the f_ideltms'for the
rehebilitatiou of rural banks
thresh a capital . heild-ep
cousisti_ of e _isite fresh
capital iafuioa awl a subsequent
Ooavereim_/er ptaa,:,ef.poFseutof,,
, a11 ar_eees,uitb, tk, C_atratDank
vhich arc Put he .e_upaid as of
he. 31, L986.
, j!.
1147 June 19, 1987 h_]aibitiq, the aecm_ of interest
iesems of the le_ or .loan
imstallm_ _tek here satired or hew
becomepest dR. Also. interest
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Circular Ho. Effectivity Date Snpu_ision/Cntrcl hreplation
inconc shall not be accrsed for
nnmtured leau/raceivables with
indications (i.e., bankruptcy,
insolvency, cessation sf operations,
or such other conditions of
financial difficulties to meet
financial obliptious as. they
nature) that Cnllectibility has
beeomdouhtful. Accrued isterest
earned but not yet collected eholl
not be cousidered as p_flta and/or
earnings elijible or dividend
declarutionc and/or prefit .sharing
purposes.
1151 A_. 27, .1987 .[_eovidea that. ALP.facility lay be
extended to finance both seasonal
production credit and mdinu- and
long-term subloans for fixed assets
andpermmeutncrking capital, .except
for the acquisition of .land. Lihewiea,
the interest rate on the nbsidiary
loans shall he merhet_orieated. Dif-
ferent rates meybe providedfor pro-
duction and longer-termcredit.
1158 Oct..5, 1987 _endinl Circular 1143 resa_ing .th_
fresh capital infusion. In cases where
Capital infusion exceedsthe ancust of
PSO0,O00.O0,the excess say he paid
into the rural bankby its stockholders
and invqsters in ncRthlyinstallments,
providedthatthe first iutaUMnt on
the fresh capital infusioa shall sot be
less than the _ount required to fulfill.
the minima 18Zrisk asset ratio. Parti-
cipating t_at banksare not qualified
to avail .the_elves .of rediecousting
unless the reqeired capital infusion is
eoa-pleted.
1166 Dec.16, 1967 Requiringall balks andsen-hank • finan-
cial intet_ediariea to adoptthe Statencnts
of Financial Accosting Standards(_F_)
in their flaanciai statemnts and reports
.to the CBwhic5are purportedto he pre-
pared in accordancewith 8eseralty
acceptedaccounting.principles.
1172 8arch29, 1988 gith. the exception of rural banks
whose applications have already
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Circular No. Effectivity Date Supervision/Control Deregulation
been approvedunder Circdlar
1143, as emendedby Circular
1158, all rural banke with
arrearales are elilible to
participate under the program
except those vith serious
irreplarities based on
examination findings of the CB,
For rural banks with supervised
credit arreara_es where the
required capital infusion exceeds
the amountof PSO0,O00, the
exceu _ be coveredby the RBe
avail/n[ itnsif of the-conversion.
echeu povided that the
alternative should not be
construed as preventin_ the
stockhalders, if they so desire
for the interest of the rural
bank, frol infusing more than
PSO0,O00..Arural hankmay have
the option of sourcing .the
paymentsto the CBfrom its cash
resources provided .such option.
rill not reduce the liquid funds
necessary to meet the deposit
reserve requirementsand day-to-
. day operationsof the .bank.
1183 September15, 1988 Requirin8 branshes, .agencies..
extension offices, etc., and/or
headoffices of colercial hanks,
and specialized 6overnmentbanks
in a particular regional grasping
outside the National Capital
Red/onto invest. therein, as a
seamsto developthat region,. 75%
of total deposit liabilities and.
provisions for "till .money,"
"Deposits"shall exclude:
(1) aovermentdeposits subject
to 75Z liguidity • floor
reqeit_ent
(2) deposit of banks"maintained
for cleariq pa_ses in
areas _ere there are no CB
clearing salts..
However, the twelve see/Dual
leoupa havebeenreckced to three
enlarfed L_oepin_snamely Luzon,
Vieayas end tiindume. The
ealeapd 8rump/up_ball be used
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CircularNo. Effectivit_Date Supervision/Control Deregulation
for purposesof determining the
regional retention of deposits.
This policy shall be deened
eolplied with if, in a particular
regiou_ the bank's lending for
the finencing of.agricultural and
export industries a_eregated 60% -
of its deposits.
1188 October28, 1988 Eliminating the " pre-requisite
investment in government
securities for purposesof estab-
lishing/opening branches end
other bankingoffices by banks.
1191 Hovember23. 1988 Provides for the formulation and
monitoring of the "new Hauila
ReferenceRates (HRRs.)whichwill be
basedouthe weightedaverageof the
interest rates paid during the
i_ediately preceedingweek by 10
colerciaI bankswith the. highest
combined levels of outstanding
deposit substitutes and tile
deposits on promissorynotes issued
and tim deposits received by these
banks, of PlO0,O00and over per
transaction account, with neturities
corresponding to the interest
periods for which such reference
rates are being deterained.
1203 I_y 16, 1989 TheCBshalltherefore refrain fron
Sustaining weak beaks except in
times of general financial emergency
or whenspecific banksface problems
of liquidity ratherthan of solvency.
There is no bar to granting new
licensee end accordingly, the
establishment of newbanks in the
future shallbe.allowed, vitb the CB
deteraiuing the qualifications such
as but not .limited to compliance
with ell requirements of existing
laws, capitalization, direction and
administration as well as the
integrity andresponsibility of the
organizers and ackinistrators.
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CircularNo. EffectivityDate- Supervision Control Deregulation
TueCBhasfiredtherequireMntto"
purchase special fivegsar govern-
lent securities as a condition to
open newbranches, le t_ral areas
that are classified ender .catepries
IV and V, all restrictions on.
opening new branuks are hereby
removed, Is urban ad particularly
metropolitan . areas, the Central.
Bank shall retain its discretionary
policy on branchiq, but alloy a
bank to opena nee branchas long
as the bank's narkst share in that
area _ould not create any market
concentration problem.
1204 _uns 23, 1989 Raising -the reserve requirement on
deposit liabilities and deposit
substitutes vith origipal natnrities
of morethan730 days fre_ 5Z to 7 %
for all financial institutions
{i.e,, [Be, thrift banks, and rural
banks) includiae nun-hank financial
intemediaries.
1207• August4, t989 Raising'ther server qulromnt on
deposit liabilities .grad deposit
substitutes vith original maturities
of lore than 730days h_m 7%to 9%
for all fi_ial institutions
includingMBFIs
1209 September1, 1989 Increasing on a staggered basis the
reserve requieemut on deposit and
deposit substitute liabilities with
original laturitian of lore than 730
days [rom 9Z to 20_ for all
financial institutions including.
liBFIS
P.educing on a staggered basis the
reserve requirementon deposit and
deposit substitute llsbiIRies riCh
original seturltles of less than730
days from21Zto 20%
1222 3anuar;19, 1990 Sets dp the criteria in the
estahlishmlt of a uositoring and
reviewsysteminthezma_uent of
the bunha" loan portfolio and other
risk a_ets to ensure that adequate
loss reserves are kept
sufficiento absorb the loss
•inherent in theseaccounts
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CircullrNo. EffectivityDale _pervi_iD_/Controi Derequlation
]223 January 19, 1990 kllovs basks full discretion in the
restructuring of their loans
(including DOSRI) to provide
flexibility in arranging the
repa_ent of such loans without
iBpairiug the financial interests of
banks but sucharrangements, should
not include loans sourced partly or
eholly fron foreign currency
obligations
i226 January31, 1990 _equiring at least 751 of total
deposits of IBs andTBs,.net of
requiredreserves against deposit
liabilities and total auunt in
vault accuouiatedin a particular
regional grouping outside the _CR
be invested therein as a mane to
developthe region.
Deposits shall include TCDs
Special Financing but shall
exclude (a) goverslent deposits
subject to 751 liquidity floor;
(b} F_/J deposits; and (o)
deposits of banksnaistained for
clearing purposesIs areas vhere
tbare are noCB clearing units
_ile loans exclude FC])Uloans
Gives banks an additional 18
soothe fros Dec. 31,. 1989 vithin
vhich to conpl_ vith the
prescribed ratio under . the
follovisg schedule:
MIRI_ _710 TARG_DAT_
25X March31, 1990
50I 3use30, 1990
62.5I l)ecesber31, 1990
75.0Z 3use 30, 1991
1229 lebroary .19, t990 setting the loan value of 80Z aad
rediscountrate of lJg p.a. for the
rediscount facility of the CB for
eligible papers in agricultural
production, cottage and snail
industries credits, general purpose
vorkingcapital financing and other
short-tern credits
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Circular No, Effectivity Date Supervision/Control Deregulatio_
1233 _rch21,1990 [ncrnnsin8the_ese_e _e_irem_t
u alltl_sofdepositsofUs and
JB_|a andondalmddeposits, |ong-
tent tim deposits and deposit
substitute liabilities ef Tk from
20Xto 21Z
Raisinlthereserve_lulfematon
savingsdepositaid _ort*tem
depositliabilitiesof_ f_ 141
to 15__d by IIpoint,eee_ math
toeeacb21Z
1234 April6,1990 Alloliul_ aM Th to enter.
into vitheat_nm,se. traAs-
actions.isvolvlq comercial
papersofamymtm,ltlesprovided
that these cellini papers are •
_egiste_l vith the SRC
1236 April 27, 1990 The broadcateJow of _mzlertakinp
in whichH[R mayinvest indirectly
or throgjh its vhelll or m_ority-
owned nbsidi_ nee4s leio_ HB
approval, immmts _ll "be
allQved tne_tseprime _ in
_i_ttu_,, ,t_i_ aid._eryiW,
m,,t_acturi_,oleulet_le end
commnity ,and social • eervicee
following the ied_strial _r_lm ,in
the 1977 _kilippine Standard
Indutrial Classification (_[C)
123"/ • _e_ 7, 1990 " i_pandin_ the allied finnncial
undertakings in vhich i_i_s, lay
invest to incl_le companies..e_a_ed
in stock b_oherW_/_urities
dealer/broker
1238 _ 28, 1990 Teaporarily pe_ the acquired
reserves a_ainst savings a_d tim
deposits vith orisinai Itlritiea of
730 days or less of T_ at 17I
1239 _ay30, 1990 Allovi_ T_s vitb ninimm paid-in
capital of _0 sillien to issue
_[e_otiable Order of _lithdraval
1240 Hay30, 1990 Allowing TBsvith a_eimm paid-in
capital o_ PSOnillion to accept
foreilm c_rrenc_ deposits: those
vhich cannotqualify lay apply as
foreign excbaegea_ests
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Circular No. Effectivity Gate Supervision/Control Deregulation
1241 June i9, 1990 Limiting investmentof RBsin fixed
assets i'D50I of neteorth, excludi_
goveenaent counterpart capital/
iuvestlent (both colon and
preferredshares)
1242 June20, 1990 Exeuptingfree the reserve require-
mete th_ deposit substitutes
againt funds deposited for projects
under the special financing prngraa
of the goverment and/or internatio-
nal financial institutions except
9TDsanddeposit substitutes arising
frou the lending operations of the
.IGLF,ALF,_ApexFinancing•Progral
industrial Inve_tunt Credit Pro_ect
([[CP) funds, provided the benefits
of the exemptionfrom the reserve
requireaent are shared vith the
ulti|ate borrowers/users of these
funds
1243 June 2t, 1990 Considering portions of pos6 inane
covered by parautsee of inter-
nationa!/rngional institutions where
the Philippine Govemmentis a
seubor/etockboldsrsuchas IFC/ADB
as non-risk assets exeupting these
frou the .coaputationof a localIB'e
-single borrower's loan liuit
1244 June29, t990 Anthorixing banks including
Philippine branches of foreign
hanks to establish off-site.
ATKssubject to the folloving
conditions:
a. A prior authority fromthe CB
needed
b. Off-site A_s are to be
installed only in centers of
_ctivities like shoppingcen-
tern, supernarkets,
hospitale, university
canpasea, providedthat the
site is within .the service
area where the applicant
banks has a rngular .branch
andadequateControl seasures
are adoptedand sulmittad to
the_
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Circular No. £ffectivity Dire Supervision/Control Deregulation
c. Seretces offend _re
lillted to: vtthdraml frol
deposit accounts, deposit
balance inquiry, transfer of
funds free one deposit
account to another deposit
account mistainedvithin the
same bank, cash advance on
credit card, request for
checkbook,•request foe cut-
off statemst
d. Generalcogpllancevith lays,
rules and regulations of
applicant banks
1245 June 29. 1990 l_oviding the requiremuts, for
credit accomodation of unsecured
loans for [Bs, _s and HFIs such
as'.
a. xere:ed copy of tke latest
• incom t_z retarss of the
borrower ud his co-taker duly
stampedas received by,the BIR
b. a copyof the herrewr'e balance
sheet duly certified bit as
independent @A tf credit
accommdatiu, exceeds. PSO0,O00
and if borrower is msgagsd in
business, a copyof profit and
loss tatemntdulF certifiedby
a @A
Grentin_ of creditaceomodatlons
apinst persssal senrityonl! in
the eloupts and for tim poriode of
tim essential for the cmpletlon of
the oporetioM to be . fiaaeced
•justified by .. tba financial
statemntsor feasibiliWlproject
studies subsitted
1246 July 24, 1990 Approvis_ the reqmst of the 9$S
that herre_inss of participoting
PFIs underits "labalikat sa Pa@a-
pounladn_ ]sdsstriya" are sot sub-
Ject to legal reserves against depo-
sit subtituts sot to the liqnidity
floor requirementson borroving fros
the IoverDest
4O
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.............................................................................................. _ .........................
1252 September14, 1990 Setting the loanvalueof 80i and
rediscnuu[rate of 14X p.a. under
CB's rediscount facility for
eligible papers in agricultural
productidn, cottage and small
industries _redlt, general purpose
workingcapital financingand uther
short-tex_credits
1253 _eptembar18, 1990 Providing guidelines for the
installationof automtic multi_
currency zoneycbaugers(AItCItC)by
banks outside their premises such
as:
a. applicant bask needs prior
authority fromCH
b. installationof A_C incenters
of activitiessuchas shopping
centers, supermarkets,hotels,
andairports; providedthe site
is within the service area where
applicant bank has a regular
branch and adequate internal
control and security measures
are adoptedand submitted to CB
c. transactionsof MtCICshallbe
booked in specific branches
mhichmet beidentifiedat the
timeof .application for the
•pnttin_ upof an Ali_C
d. services of off-site APlC_Care
limited to cbanginl foreign
excbanO,currency into peso
notes and coins, not pesos to
other foreign curriencies
e. general complianceof applicant
bankswith bankinl rules, laws
andregulations
1254 September27, 1990 Increasing minimumcapital rqnire.
mute of TBsaa[oll_s:
t
a, For existing TBs
WithI{0in • * F20U
WithHOouteide_ - PlOM
41,
Circular Kc, Kffectivity Date _q_nieiou/Coutroi kreplatiol
Thosewhichcannotcomply shall
sublit within 6, months frou
Septsmber 23, 1990, a plan by
which to increase their
capitalization uithin 2 years
b, ForTBeto be established
_ith ROis M - PIOOU
_ith 60 outside M - P 20H
1255 October12. 1990 Allovinl _e to imposepenalty.on
past.due lommof their borrowers
providedthe latter.'e failure to
pay their loans on tin is due t,o
inexcusableneglect and that .the
penalty shell be reasonable and
not unconscionable
1257 October23. 1990 Exsmptinlborrowingsof financial
institutions' frsm .the GSIS
arisi_ frea their participation
in its Industrial and CoBercial
•.Lendiulkrofran
1260 October30, 1990 _ettiq the Loanvalue of 80I and
rediscount rate at i4Z p.a. under
CB's rediscmmt facility, for
eliBibie papers in agricultural
productian, cottage and .small
industries credits, ffsmeraI,purpose
vorki_ capital flmmu,_ingend. •other
short-tern credits, provided loan
-value for-expert credits nhali be
lO01
1261 lioveaher9, 1990 •Increasing the reserve requirement '
on all types of deposits of [Bs and
non-banks nith quasi-banking.
functions; on demnddeposits, I_OW
accounts anddeposit nhetitutes of,
YBs and on demnd deposits and NOW
accounts of i_ ft_ 2lZ to 22_
(effective Nov. 15, 1990) and to 23Z
(effective _v. 30, 1990}
_ifyiu the reserve rcquirsment on
navings andshort and long-tern time
deposits of T[]sand RBsat 17Z and
14Z, respectively.
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1264 NovemberB, I_90 Providing for the revised guidelines
for the Organizationof Cooperative
Banks.
1276 March5,1991 Exempti_.from the reserve
requirements special time deposits
offinancialinstitutionsu derthe
special financing programs of the
governmentand/or. international
financialinstitutionsbeing or
previouslyadministeredby the CB
and liaitedto the following
programs:
(a)CB - Departmentof Education,
CultureandSportsICB-DECS)
(b)PalawanIntegratedAreaDevelop-
BentPro_ect
Ic_AgriculturalGuaranteeand Loan
Fund- _ationalFoodand A_ri-
cultureCouncil{AGLF-HFA¢)
(d}RepublicA tNoo3690(I_3690)
(e)LocalCounterpart- Bureauof
Treasury (LC-BT)
If_Hinistryof AgrarianRelorm-
CentralProject HanaaemeotUnit
(HAR_CPMU)
(_)Philippineiqnaculture_velop-
pmentFund(PADF_
(h)ComprebessiveAgriculturalLoan
Fund#CALF)
(i) CooperativeHarketin_Program
(CMP)
1280 April15,19_1 Providiog.for therevisedrules
and regalltionsgoverningthe
establisbamntof branchesof RBs
asfolla_s:
(a)RBs withunimpairedcapital
of _lO Mot more, net of
government• .equity, may
establish branches is any
region,except in the HCRend
in the.citiesof Cebu and
Davao.
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{b) RBs with unimpaired capital
of less than _lOM ,netof
governmentequity, may
establish branches in the
region wherethe head office
is ]ocated, except in the
NCRand is the cities of Cebu
andl)avao,t_s in theNCRnay
establish branchesonly in
Region III and tV while ms
in CebuCity endDavaoCity
nay branchout only sithin
their respectiveregions but
outside said cities.
{c, _iddin8requiresentsisposed
in lBs and TBs shall not
appl_to ms.
(d_ App]i_an_ banksmust comply
with _enerel bankin_ rules
an_regulations.
{e)Approvedbranchshall be
openedwithinsixmonths,from
the dateof receiptof notice
ofapprovalofapplication.
L281 April15,!991 o AllowingK_sandTHetobidfo_
franchiseinthe estabDshment
of branchesand oettin_the
•minimumbidsasfollows:
AREA AMOUNT
NCR.CehuCity _4.0million
andDavaoCity
lot classcities 2.0million
andmunicipalities
other areas NONE
o Declassifyingtheservicearea
basedontheclassificationof
provinces,municipalitiesand
cities by the N50.
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o Li|it_q the zelbee of avarded
bids for vhich no branch/
benkiq office hu been opened
as yet to lO fnreach at any
given tim.
1286 Hay23_ 1991
oLiftind the condition that off-
site iastomated teller machine
(ATHs}my be opened only in
the service areas shere a bank
has an existing branch.
o.I)eletin8 the reqsiruents of
prior CB approval for the
astablishmnt of ATHs,provided
basks sublit a report to the
Supervision and kasisation
Sector of the CBon ATHsvhich
they establish
1288 June 4, [991 o RequLri_ atl banks to set
aside a pettish of their total
loan portfolio basedon their
Consolidated Statnent of
Condition/Balance _beet and
sake it avaiLabLefor nil
enterprise credit. Theportinn
mandated to be so set
aside shall be as (olios :
5:_ by December3li :1991
10%by Deceaber3t, 1992
thrush _ecnber 3L, L995
5I by kcenber 3L,.1996
0% by Pecenber3L, 1997
1289 June6,!991 o inclusion ,of insurance
cowanies enongthe non-allied
financial nndsrtakiu_ eligible
•for investaent by _[Ib,
provided thatno DOgB[s•shall
hold or ovnmrs than20% of
the subscribed capital stock or
equity of the ievestee
insurancecoapaw.
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1290 June 17, 199l Deleting the requirement of
compliance with the loans to
deposit ratio for 4 consecutive
quarters as one of the conditions
for the processing/approvalof a
bank's application to {,a)qualify
for branching privilege; {b)
permit to Operate new banking
offices; and{e) to avail of CB
credit facilities and other
special financing programs
managedbytheCB,providedthat
at the tiw of application,
applicantbank is in compliance
withtheprescribed ratio.
1294 July 9, 1991 o Raising the private capitalization
o_ existingRBsto_Imillionand
conplying withthisin 4 equal
semi-annualinstallmentsstarting
January1, 1992, providedbanksin
the N_ and the eltles of Cebuand
Davao _ich will have changes in
the mjorityownershipor control
of the voting stocks ehouldComply
with requirementsfor new ms of
_20MandPIO,repectively.
o P_quirin8 new _s to be
establishedoutside theNCRand the
citiesofCebuandl)avaot putup
a minimum,privatepaid-in capi_ai
of]P2 million.
o Requiringlocal cooperativebanks
tobe establishedto havea mini-
mummid-in capitalofPI.25H
as prescribed by the Cooperative
CodeofthePhilippines.
o Adoptinga capital build-up
programfor existing CRBewith
private paid-in capital
contribution of less than. _1.25
million andcomplyingwith this in
4 equal semi-a_uainstallments
startingJanuaryi.1992.
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1295 July 16, 1991 Providing for sanctions/penalties
for exceedingthe single berroeer's
liait as follows :
(a) MonetaryPenalties
First Offense- _500/day free
the day excess started up to
date whenexcess waseliminated
SubsequentOffense - PSOOO/day
fromdate cf violation
{bt Other_auctions
First Offense - reprimandfor
the directors/officers who
approved the avaiiuent with
warning that subsequent
violations shall be subject to
moresevere sanctions
SubsequentOffense - suspension
for 90 days for directors/
officers who approved the
availunt and suspensionof bank
from branching out and-
availuent of CB rediscounting
facilities until excess is
eliuinated.
1296 July 16, 1991 o Requiring all KBs {whether,
existing or to be established, to
have capital-accounts of _750
ailiioo each.
Requiring all EgSs (whether
existing or to be established) to
havecapital accounts of at least
P1.5 billion each
Alloviog bankswhichdo not zest
above requirements to submit
within three monthsfrou date of
approvalof these policies a plan
by which to increase their
capitalizationwithina periodof
one year.Also,stipulatesthat
CB shallreviewperiodicallythe
needforadditionalcapitalby all
bankstoassuretheirstability
and widentheir capabilityto
servetheneedsofthepublic
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1297 July 16.1991 o Inclusionofinsurancecompanies
amongthesct-alliedundertaking
eligibleforinvestmentby HBs;
suchinvestmentbyEl_Bsin any
singleenterprise should not
exceed35Z ofthe totalvotinl
capitalstockofthate,terprise
and thatfor the purpose of
deterniningcompliancewith this
ceiling,theequityhOldi,gsof
the bank in the undertaking, vhen
combinedwiththoseofits wholly
or majority-owedsubsidiaries
shall not exceed35Zof the equity
of thatundertaking
o Superseding CB Circular 1289.
dated _une6, 1991.
: 1303 August22.1991 o _xemptingspecialtim depositsof
l_s and CRBs underthe Hulti-
Livestock Dispersal Loan Program
fromtSereserver quirenent
1304 A_ust21.1991 o Reclassifylngthe folloming
areasvithi,thecitiesofCebu
andbavao_der the category of
"other areas" {for which no.
minimum bid is prescribed)
distinctfrom the strictly
urbanand citycenters :
Ceb,City- PardoSanliicolae
DaVaoCity- CaliuanHintal
PanacanLasang
T_ilTaloio
I_serin8theprescribedminimum
bid ofthe llorthRsclamtion
Service Area in CebeCity and
theAgdao-$asa_rviceAres in
I)avaoCityfroa_4millionto
P2 million, being less
developedservice areas vithin
CebnCitl ud DavaoCity.
1306 September19, 1991 o Prescribins the revised rules and
regulations governin6 the
establis[mentofbroncSen.ofRBe.
specificallycoipllaneemltb.the
submission of the follo_iq
doc_ents :
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(a) certified true copy of the
resolution of the bank'sboard
of directors authorizing the
application for the
establishment of the
additional bankingoffice:
(hi banking facilities and
,services to be offered:
(c) projected statement of
condition at theend of the
first and secondsemesters of
operations of the proposed
bankingoffices;
(d) statement of estimated
earnings andexpenses for the
first 12monthsof operation;
(e) organizational sot np of the
proposed banking office
showingthe proposedpositions
and annualpay for each and
the nanes, qualifications and
experiences of the proposed
manager and other officers:
and
(f) bank premises and initial
outlay
1307 September.25, 1991 o Allowing banksto bid for as
zany-franchisesas they can
afford
o Requiris8 banksto open and
operate the bruch coveredby
the franchisewithin a period
of oneyearfromthe date of
award
1308 October3, 1991 o Providing for the specific
violations/exceptions which will
or nay prevent banks frog
participating in the biddingof
branchLicenses u folios:
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,In) investwmtia equities exceeds
prescribed ceilings;
(b) loans in excess of single
borrover's llsit;
(c_ investmst in bank premises
exceedsceilings;
{d) loans panted without
supporting financial state-
ments and/ur credit infore-
ation or loans +hick are not
justified by financial
stateMmts and/or credit
information (total amountof
such loaua_rngates 5Z of
netvorth);
(e) +onus f_anted in excess of
saximm lom value (total
excess is .mmmt is 5Z of
neWortk):
(f) limit ol stoekbeldings;
(g) excess loans to directore,
officers, stockholders and
.their Pelated iiterests;
(h) non-compliance vith. ainitm
capital re_irenent;
(i) non-compliancevith capital to
risk-asset ratio (5 or more
tines deficient within a 60-
dayperiod during the last 6-
months);
(j) non-compliance vith ledal
reserve for deposits and
deposit substitutes;
(k) loans apt_oved/released
vithout astberity from
appropriate .. bodF/offlcer
(aggregates to 5Zof networtb);
5O
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......................................................................................................................
{1} loans released without comply-
ing with the terts of approval
thereof (aggregates to 5Z of
networth_;
(n) loans released before full
doc_estation of papers
(aggregates to 5Z of
networtbl; and
(nl when the aggregate of all
loans under (k), (l), (m) is
equal to.lOZ of neWorth
o Requiring bankswhich have been
awarded,a branch franehLse to
operate, within a year from the
date of award, otbervlse, the
franchise as, well as .the
consideration paid to the _ for
said franchise nlmll be forfeited
1312 October 15, 1991 o Listing the incentives for
mrgers, and consolidations
amongbanksand other financial
interlediari_a:
(a) revahmtlon of bank
presisen, inprovemnts and
bank equipmnt of the
Instltntions basedan fair
valuation of the property
subject to review and
approvalof.the CB;
(b) conversionor upgrading of
the existing headoffices,
branches end/or other
offices of the nerged or
absorbedinstitutions into
branches of the new or
surviving financial
institutions:
(c) condonation of liquidated
danagesand/or penalties on
loan arrearages to the CB
of l_._ich are parties to
the *ergsr/consolidation,
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provided, with arrearages
are paid infull or covered
by a plan of payment
paTableon ae equal monthly
uortizatton schedule over
a periodnot exceeding 10
yearn;
(d) relocation of branches/
offices Vithin one year
from date of merger or
consolidation resulted in
duplication of branches/
offices in a service area;
(e) Paymentin installments of
outstanding penalties in
legal reserve deficiencies
and interest on overdrafts
with the _ as of the date
of aerger er consolidation;
If) Bookingon staggered basis
over a sexism period of 5
years of unhookedvaluation
reserves andother capital
adjustlents resulting from
the merger/consolidation;
(8) Sxenptlon fro, the 20Z +
30% of limitations on
voting ntockholdingsin the
new or surviving
institution of any person
or persons related to each
other within the third
• degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or corporations,
respectively;.this shall be
allowedenly if:
o banks that are being
nergedare distressed
n whenever any of the,
stockholders exceed the
20%and i30I ceilings,
their holdings shall not
be increased,, but maybe
2Circular BO. gffectivity Date ._,porvision/Contro[ Dereplation
reduced and once
reduced, shall not be
increased beyond the
required ceilings
(h) [n the case of TBs, the
mergedor consolidated bank
uy be alloyed to establish
branches in Hetro Hanila
provided the paid-in
capital of the urged or
consolidated bank is at
least PiO0million, subject
to the provision of CB
Circular 1281
(i) Any right or privilege
granted a .merging bank
under a rehabilitation
programpreviously approved
by the Honetary Board or
underanyspecial _uthortty
previously granted shall
continue to be in effect
(j) Training of officers and
staff of the aer_.ing or
coneo|idating RUeby the CB
1314 October21, 1991 o AutSoriziugstock savings and loan
" associations (55[£e)to use the
Lers "SavingsandLoanBank"an_
not the tern "Ban_koq Bayan" in
their corporateor business sues
provided they havecomplied with
the required minima paid-in
capital and the tern has been
duly incorporated in the SSGAe
corporate or business use as. it
appears in the articles of
incorporation
o Imposing a PIO0 adliuietrative
fine for violation of foregoing
rules
13i5 October29, 199t o 9ets the terze of reference for
the iapleeeutation of the CFIgP
with the fotlovinj objectives:
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(a) raise the capital hale of the
cmmtuside financial
iutitetiols by eicouragi_
•existing nd,sevinveStors to
infuse fresh eqaity into said
institetio_ and thereby
accelerate tke g0vemtent's
ecoaonic developllentefforts:
(b) reduce the _ebt burden of
elioible coutry_ide fiuascial
inetit_tio_ andthe coeree-
pokiinl financial strain on
the governmentin continallt,
asoistiq then; and
(c) improve tk ' long-term
viability of tha eount_side
financial tm_itntiou as al
effective oeanm, to mobilize.
saviap ud eeedit
•o A|Loei_ operatiq Us &Tk Vhese
lain operatiml are in tha
count_side led individuals,
cooparati_es ,asd/or c_epaeatiou
qualified to makean investment in
the BB or qualified YD to
participate in the Prolrall
o Coversall put du borro_inls of
RBsandTk as of AlfOl_t,30,. 1991
in the foes of eediscolnted loans,
Cg:IBD loame imetuding those
under plans, of paint and
aereare_es co_eted, into.._P
,equity wkr CB _rc_laes. 1143
•and 1172
1316 October31, 1991 o _roSibiti_ J_ fL_ declaring
cask divideuk ff _alJea vit5
the CBmmmmto PI lillion or
we, _lm covered by an
a_roved plan of pa_t vhieh is
•heie_ f_tly emptied vii5 and that
cash divideu_e shall not exceed
•.IOZ_ _ ..
..-....,.-...,..-.....-. ..... _-.-.---.-- ...... .-,,-..-.........._.. .... -. ...... -- ...... .-. ....... ...-.',,...,,--.......,-....
Sources: Lamhaete ndblal_OS, "AnAmmemmtof Policies Affecti_ the [_imial f_tor," tgM_8.
Variou Central _ ' CircaIars, L_-9l.
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held by one bank, is allowed unless prior approval from the Monetary Board is secured. These changes
are expected to minimize conflict of interest and avert insider abuse.
Audit and Reporting Requirement. To make bank transactions more transparent, the CB
requires an annual financial audit of banks by independent auditors. To facilitate its job of
supervising banks, the Monetary Board requires banks to keep a complete record of all pertinent loan
documents which shall be made available for inspection and/or examination. In 1990, the CB required
KBs and TBs to submit proof of financial capacity of their outstanding credit accommodations on an
annual basis. While these measures were intended to strengthen the supervisory function of the CB,
some m_0sures were also enacted to give banks limited discretion in specific areas of bank operation
and management. This included allowing banks full discretion in the restructuring of their loans,
including DOSRI loans, to provide flexibility in arranging repayment without impairing the
financial interest of banks. However, such arrangements do not include loans sourced partly or wholly
from foreign currency obligations.
To enhance its examination capability, a number of measures were also implemented by the
CB. In 1986, the CB introduced a pilot group to audit the computer system of banks. In addition, a
monitoring andreview system in the managementof loan portfolio and other risk assets was established
to ensure that adequate reserves are maintained to absorb the loss inherent in these accounts.
Finally, in a major policy shift, the CB ina circular dated May 16, 1989 moved away from the
policy of sustaining weak banks except in times of general financial emergency or when specific banks
face problems of liquidity rather than solvency. This is in sharp contrast with the policy followed during
the 1981 liquidity crisis that led to the government's take-over of weak banks (Lamberte and
Relampagos 1990).
Capital Adequacy. The above measures were intended to enhance the effectiveness of bank
supervision. To strengthen the financial structure and encourage competition in the system, measures
were similarly instituted. To improve banking stability, increases in the capital base of banks were
enacted. As early as 1980, the CB had been gradually increasing the minimum capital requirements
of various types of banks. On July 16, 1991, the minimum capitalization of KBs and universal banks
was raised from P500 million and P1 billion, respectively, to P750 million and P1.5 billion (Table
12). Meanwhile, existing TBs with head offices in Metro Manila are now required to increase their
capital base from P 10 million to P 20 million. Those with head offices outside Metro Manila are
required to make the necessary adjustment from P5 million to P10 million. The increase in capital
requirement is particularly required of new TBs in Metro Manila. Beginning 1990, new TBs in Metro
Manila have to put up P100 million while those with head offices outside Metro Manila have to raise
P20 million.
The minimum capital requirement for _Bs was also increased to improve the viability of the
system. Under the previous guidelines, existing RBs outside Metro Manila were required to have
a minimum capital ranging from P0.5 million for ordinary RBs to P2 million for Cooperative Rural
Banks (CRB). This guideline was superseded by a 1991 circular which increased the required
capitalization for RBs to P1 million for existing RBs, P2 million for new RBs, and P1:25 million for
CRBs. The new provision requires that the incremental capital has to be paid-up in 2 years.
Tabie 12. CHANGES iN THE MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS,
BY BANK TYPE, 1NMILLION PESOS
•Item 1980 1989 1990 1991
Commercial Banks aJ
OrdinaryKBs 100 500 500 750
Unibanks 500 1000 1000 1500
Thrift Banksb/
(a) Existing
With HO in Metro Manila 10 10 20 20
WithHO outside Metro Mta. 5 5 • 10 .10
(b) New:
WithHO in Metro Manila 20 20 100 100
WithHE)outside Metro Mla. 10 10 20 20
RuralBanks c/ 0.5 0.5
WithinMetro Manila 20 20
FirstClassCities 10
Cebuand Davao City 10
OutsideMetro Manila and
FirstClass "A" Cities
(a) OrdinaryRBs 0.5
(b) IntegratedRBs 0.75
_(c)CRBs 2
Other Areas
(a) Existing 1
:_(b)New 2
(c) CRBs 1.25
a/Source: CB Circulars793 (Jury 10_1990), 1214 (NovemberiS,1989)
and t296 (July16, 1991) .....
b/SoUrce:CB Circulars740 (July10; 1980) and 1254 (September 27,199g)
c/Source: CB Circular741 (Juiy1.0,1980) and 1294 (July 9, 1991)
u-1
ol
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These changes in capital requirements have important implications for the banking industry.
While the expanded average net worth would enable banks to generate more volume of business and
improve the public's perception of their stability, it may also result in greater concentration in the
banking industry, which is perceived to have an oligopolistic structure. In the context of the 1972
capital build-up program, Saldafia (1984) found that the program increased the level of concentration
of firms in the banking industry. Previously noted trade-offs between profitability and .leverage
or liquidity risk were accentuated after the perfection of the capital build-up program. That is, the
average profitability, leverage and liquidity risk indicators of the banking system increased after
the CB legislation of 1972.
To further strengthen the financial system, liberal provisions and incentives for consolidation
and mergers were also instituted. The incentive structure provided, among other things, the condonation
of liquidated damages and/or penalties on loan arrearages to CB of RBs under rehabilitation; staggered
booking of unbooked valuation reserves and other capital adjustments resulting from merger or
consolidation; and exemption from the 20 percent and 30 percent limitations on voting stockholdings
in the new institution, of any person or persons related to each other within the third degree of
consanguinity or _ffinity.
Bank Entry and Expansion. Important measures to increase competition were also adopted,
•including the relaxation of the deposit retention scheme and the liberalization of rules on bank entry
and expansion. The new guideline on deposit retention expands the definition of the service area into
only three major island groupings: Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. In response to various criticisms
on the restrictive policy on bank entry and branching, the CB has gradually liberalized entry
regulations since 1989. These policies included lifting the required purchase of special 5-year
government securities; lifting all restrictions in opening new branches in service area categories IV and
V; and the establishment of off-site automated teller machines (ATMs) without CB approval and in
service areas where a bank has no existing branch. Starting 1992, the CB is expected to further loosen
up restrictions on bank branching.
These deregulation measures are expected to improve access to banking services and enhance
efficiency of the system. Tan (1989) and Chan (1991)argued that the restricted bank entry policy
in the Philippines has been responsible for the shallowness of the country's financial sector. The
policy was inimical to savings mobilization as shown by the low M3/GNP ratio of the Philippines
compared to other Asian countries. Moreover, shielding inefficient banks from increased competition
has resulted in high intermediation costs.
3. Role of the Philippine DepOsit Insurance Corporation (PDIC)
The Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) has generally played a passive role
in the financial system as it merel)_j paid insured deposits of failed banks and occassionally helped
package rehabilitation schemes for/troubled banks. It is also saddled with personnel problems as a result
of the spate of bank failures it has had to attend to. For these, it has relied on the CB's personnel
complement to undertake some of its functions. Because of its limited capitalization, the PDIC
depends heavily on borrowings from the CB to pay insured depositors of failed banks. Strengthening
and expanding PDIC's present functions can contribute significantly in protecting depositors and
enhancing their confidence in the banking system.
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There are several proposals andlegislative initiatives for strengthening thePDIC's role. Among
these proposed measures are appointing the PDIC as receiver/liquidator of troubled banks and
increasing its capital base. The appointment of the PDIC as receiver in all cases of bank failures is
expected to solve the problem of conflict of interest which is alleged each time the CB acts as
conservator, receiver, and liquidator of distressed banks. Such a situation has led to increased
personal suits against CB personnel, thereby affecting their performance.
From these various proposals, a consolidated version of HB 7640 and SB 1539 was recently
enacted (R.A. 7400). The new law provides, among other things, for the following: an increase in
PDIC's permanent insurance fundfrom P2 billion to P3 billion; an increase in the maximum insurable
deposit amount from P 40,000 to P 100,000; an increase in the assessment rate from 1/12 to 1/5 of one
percent per annum; the participation of two representatives from the private sector in PDIC's Board',
and the power to issue a cease and desist order.However, the new law does not contain a provision
that automatically empowers the PDIC as the receiver and liquidator of troubled banks.
While these new provisions significantly address some of the identified concerns, it is arguable
whether these would have a significant impact. Forinstance, Lamberte andRelarnpagos (1990) argued
that increasing the coverage of insurable deposits from its current level of P40,000 to some higher
figure would bring little benefits to small depositors. This is because 96 percent of the total number
of deposit accounts of the banking system as of 1987 arc already covered by existing maximum deposit
insurance coverage. Large depositors usually place their resources in high-yielding securities and trust
accounts which are subject to lower reserve requirements. Moreover, increasing the insurance coverage
has the probable effect of inducing moral hazard problems among banks. It is for this reason that, in
the context of the Savings and Loans ' (S & L) scandal in the United States, a similar proposal was
vigorously resisted.
However, increasing the permanent insurance fund is likely to bring more benefits to
depositors. This is because of PDIC's low capital base which prevents it from paying all insured
depositors promptly. Similarly, the increase in the assessment rate provides an additional revenue
for PDIC to service its portfolio of insured deposits.
4. Rehabilitation" of DBP and PNB
A major institutional reform undertaken in the financial sector was the rehabilitation and
restructuring of the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP). Priority was accorded to these two institutions by the national government (NG) among all
other Government Financial Institutions (GFIs) because of the size of their non-performing assests
(NPAs) and the concomitant budgetary losses these entailed for the government. Both banks became
insolvent as a result of behest loans granted to favored political groups during the previous
administration. To relieve these institutions of the financial burden of servicing their nonperforming
assets, the government arranged the transfer of such assets to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT)
in 1986. Simultaneously, institutional strengthening activities were undertaken. These included
substantial staff reduction, rationalization of branch networks, change of senior management, and
introduction of systematic credit procedures.
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It must be emphasized that while financial rehabilitation was necessary because of the
concomitant budgetary losses and adverse effects on the financial system, the complementary privati-
zation program is aimed at ensuring their continued viability, and providing an unequivocal signal
of the government's intent to get out of economic activities that the private sector could undertake
better, and more efficiently. This also forestalls potential moral hazard problems as a.result of the
restructuring exercise.
The financialrestructuring in the case of DBP resulted in the reduction of its assets from P74
billion in 1985 to P10 billion in 1986. In the ease of PNB, the restructuring plan involved the transfer
of P47 billion in assets to APT and liabilities of P55 billion to the national government, plus a write-
off of an additional P5 billion in assets.
The objective of the financialrestructuring is to reorient DBP into a wholesale bank with private
sector orientation to mobilize long-term funds and act as a market in long-term papers. This institutional
reorientation is especially important because of the scarcity of term credits needed for the development
of the economy. As a complementary measure, a number of special credit programs/windows
previously administered by the CB were transferred to DBP and LBP. These included the transfer
of IGLF and APEX to DBP, and ALF to LBP. Internally, institutional strengthening to support DBP's
reorientation to wholesale banking included the creation of a capital market department" and a
f'mancial institution department. In the case of PNB, the eventual objective of the rehabilitation
is to retain its expanded commercial banking functions, with government retaining a minority interest
after its privatization. It must be emphasized that although GFIs, especially DBP, are expected to
perform developmental functions, they are at the same time required to be financially viable and
not dependent on special assistance from the government.
At present, DBP and PNB have attained normal operational status. Freed from the burden of
its nonperforming assets, PNB has been one of the most profitable financial institutions in the country
for the past two years. With its impressive performance, the first block of government shares comprising
15percent of equity offered to the public was sold out in advance. A second block of government equity
for public offering which is intended to reduce government share to a minority interest of 49 percent
is expected to be equally successful. In the case of DBP, it has also realized profits from its operations.
Negotiations are on-going for the privatization of its branches in the light of DBP's reorientation into
a wholesale bank.
5. The Rural Banking System
As a result of their loan arrearages problem and the shift towards market-oriented credit policy,
a significant number of RBs were rendered insolvent and/or put under receivership. However, due
to their important role in the rural economy, the government undertook a program of financial
rehabilitation in 1986. The program was designed to strengthen the RBs through a capital build-up
program consisting of prerequisite fresh capital infusion and/or plan of payment of their arrearages with
the CB. Of the total licensed RBs of 1,016 as of 1990, 524 applied for rehabilitation. Of these, 484
had their applications approved by the Central Bank.
Interestingly, a complementary program called the CountrysideFinanciallnstitution
Enhancement Program (CFIEP) was recently established with a similar objective, but with a different
incentive structure and modes of compliance. This is meant to entice RBs and other rural financial
institutions to put up the requiredcapital infusion and/or to enter into merger or consolidation, or both.
The rehabilitation program in general is expected to strengthen the rural financial market
by weeding out inefficient banks. Since it may be too early for the impact of the 1986 rehabilitation
to be felt, we can only conjecture that the establishment of such a complementary program strongly
suggests the difficulties encountered in enlisting the participation of RBs. Given the poor performance
of the previous rehabilitation attempt in 1979, it may be asked why the CB has preferred the
rehabilitation approach, instead of a much more stringent criteria. It has been argued, for _instance,
that because of the stigma attachedto bank failure and weakness, rehabilitated banks have experienced
difficulty in attracting clients who would prefer doing business with stable banks (Tan 1989).
In addition, a new legislation to enhance the viability of the RB system was recently enacted.
R.A. 7353, which is a consolidated version of HB 28736 and SB. 1554, provides for various fiscal
incentives, exemptions and other privileges.
The major incentives include (a) exemptions from payment of all taxes, fees and charges except
corporate income tax and local taxes, fees and charges of all RBs created under this Act for a period
of five years; (b) lower reserve requirements; and (c) mandatory subscription by GFIs in the form of
preferred shares equal to the fully paid subscribed and unimpaired capital of the private stockholders.
It needs to be emphasized that if the intent of R.A. 7353 is to address the problems and enhance
the viability of the RB system, these are being addressed by specific programs such as the ongoing
CFIEP. Moreover, a nuinber of provisions in the new law are contrary to current policy. For instance,
the mandatory subscription by GFIs contravenes current privatization efforts. Similarly, a specific
provision allowing appointive or elective public official to serve in any capacity raises the possibility
of conflict of interest, and sets a disturbing precedent.
6. Directed Credit Programs in Agriculture
In 1986, the consolidation of special lending programs of the Department of Agriculture into
the Comprehensive Agricultural Loan Fund (CALF) signalled a radical shift in policy orientation of the
government. As part of the new policy orientation, direct lending programs were terminated. Instead,
agricultural credit guarantee schemes were promoted and expanded through capital allocation from
the CALF portfolio. Underlying the new policy orientation was the view that the key to integrating the
rural financial market is the introduction of financial innovations through the reduction of lending risk
and administrative cost.
This is a significant move,in view of various country experiences on the adverse consequences
of subsidized directed credit programs on the development and growth of the financial market. On
the other hand, credit guarantee mechanisms are perceived to have only minimal distortions because
they presumably leave intact the decision processes and institutional relationships of the private credit
market. As such, they are also perceived to be generally cost-effective since a guarantee institution
can leverage a given fund base by a multiple compared to direct lending programs. Nonetheless, recent
analysis of the performance of ex!sting agricultural credit guarantee mechanisms indicate that while
the subsidy cost of these mechanisms are indeed lower than government-directed credit programs,
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the benefits in terms of additional lending are much limited than previously expected. Moreover, most
of the benefits have accrued to the banks and to program beneficiaries, most of whom have well-
established records of financial transactions with banks, or with proven credit worthiness (Llanto et
al. 1991; Bautista 1992).
C. Impact on Informal Credit Market
In view of the size and importance of informal credit markets in the Philippines and in most
developing countries, a discussion of the impact of financial market policy reforms on their operations
is clearly in order. While there exists no systematic data base that clearly captures the impact of changes
in financial market policy on informal credit markets, evidence from various over-time household
surveys suggest that financial market policies affect informal credit markets via the availability
of formal credit.
Bautista (1992) drawing from various studies noted that cheap credit policies during the 1970s,
which resulted in an increased flow of formal credit to agriculture, were accompanied by a decline
in the proportion of households borrowing from informal sources. In the 1980s, when various
financial and banking reforms were implemented in tandem with a more restrictive credit policy
environment, the size of the informal credit market expanded from previous levels. Surveys indicate
that financial and agricultural sector policies have varying effects on rural credit markets. While
expansionary creditpolicies during the 1970s resulted in an increased flow of credit, this merely
substituted for informal credit in the short-term without the concomitant lasting effect on farmers'
credit-worthiness. In contrast, nonfinancial agricultural sector policies in the 1970s such as land reform
and public investment in irrigation had more profound and real effects. The income effects arising
from increased productivity led to increased consumption demand. Hired labor substituted for family
labor, leading to the emergence of more active labor markets. Moreover, the larger market attracted new
entrants and induced competition in trading and other auxiliary activities in rural economies. These in
turn shaped various aspects of informal credit markets.
V. MONETARY AND BANKING POLICIES FOR AGRO-INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT: INDICATIVE IMPACTS
AND LEGISLATIVE/ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS
This section describes the expected short- and long-run impacts and the legislative/
administrative requirements of preferred monetary, credit and banking policies supportive of agro-
industrial development. The preferred set of policies discussed below takes off from the policy gaps
identified in the previous section.
A. The Countryside Agro-Industrial Development Strategy (CAIDS)
The CAIDS was adopted by the Aquino government in December 1989 through Resolution No.
39, as its centerpiece development strategy. It has been identified as the focal strategy for the
attainment of rapid, sustainable, and equitable economic growth. The main features of the CAIDS are:
modernization and increase in productivity of agriculture, industrial competitiveness, growth and
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dispersal through agro-based industrialization, andintegration of economic activities in the country.
These are envisioned to be accomplished through private sector initiatives.
The five majorstrategies identified are: (a) increased production andstabilized supply of basic
food commodities; (b) aggressive modernization and diversification of. agriculture ,to in_,ease
productivity and encourage the establishment of agro-processing plants, to intensify the linkage
between agriculture and 'industry; (c) enforcement of conservation and rejuvenation measures to
ensure long-term sustainability of land and marine resourues; (d) countryside industrialization; and
(e) establishment of competitive outward-oriented industries which wfllgeneratc the forei_ ¢_xchange
neededtofmaneedevelopment.
To operationalizeCAIDS, variousimplementationmechanismswere identified.These
•includedtheestablishmentofPeople'sIndustrialEstates(PIEs),RegionalIndustrialCenters(RICs),
and Agro-IndustrialDevelopmentAreas(AIDAs).The PIEs wereidentifiedas -themajor
implementingmechanism for theoperationalizationofCAIDS.
The PIEs eonceptenvisages a core or anchor of processing activities centered around the raw
materials readily available in the area. The development of PIEs takes into consideration the following:
(a) establishment andviable operation of appropriate processing plants 'andeommon service facilities
by organized private sector groups; (b) linkage of farms to processing areas and market centers; (c)
provision of basic infrastructure support facilities; and (d) enhancement of agricultural production.
The RICs were envisaged to operationalize the regional dispersal of industries.These would
supply the technology and other inputs needed by the PIEs. Finally, the AIDAs wereconceptualized
to provide a more concrete and focused mode of implementing CAIDS..It involves the identification
of areas/villages as strategic centers for agro-industrialdevelopment.
Given the namm of the proposed economic activities, the development of viable micro, small
and medium enterprises (MSMEs) has been identified as a key component. While the government
hardly used to pay enough attention to MSMEs, there has been an increased interest in the potential
role of MSMEs. This is based on the experiences of Japan, Taiwan and Korea, where MSMEs served
as anchors in their sueeessfuldrive towards industrialization. The increased interest is further bolstered
by the recognition that MSMEs are thought to be labor-intensive and generally able to generate jobs
at lower investment cost than larger industrial firms (Lamberte 1990) and to play two important roles
in the economy: (a) as downstream users of upstream products (e.g. footwear requiring leather,
garments requiting textiles; furniture using lumber); and (b)as expo/'t earners for the economy
(Fabella 1988). Within this framework, monetary and financial policies will be supportive by
addressing the need for mobilizing resources, maintaining price stability, enhancing efficiency in
thefinancialintermcdiationprocessandstimulatingeconomicgrowth.
B. Monetary, Credit and Banking Policies:for Agro-Industrial Development
It is to be emphasized that while monetary, credit and banking policies can support agro-
industrial development, they cannot work independently of the rest of macroeconomie policies.
Lessons from various eoun_es including the Philippines show that financial reforms carried out
against an unstable maemeconomic background can makeinstability worse. Complete liberalization/
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of interest rates in countries with high and unstables rates of inflation can lead to high real interest
rates and wide spreads between lending and deposit rates. Reforms should start by controlling fiscal
deficit and establishing macroeconomic stability, In the same manner, where prices are distorted
owing to protection or price controls, financial liberalization may not significantly improve the
allocation of resources. In fact, deregulation may worsen matters by causing the financial sytem to
respond more flexibly to bad signals.
Thus, the primary task of crafting a package of preferred policy options on monetary, credit
and banking policies is to finetune current policies in order to: (a) minimize seetoral bias; (b)
strengthen or improve the foundation of banking and finance to enforce contracts, disclosure
requirements, and the structure of prudential regulation and supervision; and (c) fill up existing gaps
that constrain the development of sectors critical to overall economic development. Dir_t intervention
in finance must be minimized, and must be replaced by an adequate, less invasive system of laws and
regulations.
Table 13 provides a listing of preferred policy options and initiatives on monetary and banking
policies and the associated legislative/administrative requirements for implementing such programs.
1. Stable Movements in Monetary Aggregates
As a basic prerequisite for development, in particular for agro-industrial development,
monetary policy must be geared towards maintaining stability in the general price level. Stable
inflation through prudent monetary and fiSCal policies has a favorable effect on long-term investment
planning decisions of business and on the development of the financial sector. One disturbing feature
of monetary policy in the Philippines, discussed earlier, is the use of interest rate policy to defend
the exchange rate. This has resulted in more volatile and high domestic interest rates, with important
implications for financial market development. High interest rates lead to higher inflation (Mariano
1985), which is what the present policy of exchange rate stabilization is trying to avoid. The biggest
casualty of having an overvalued currency is the export sector:
Although the need for a stable exchange rate is imperative, a realistic exchange rate policy is
equally important. This means that the CB should adopt an even less interventionist stance. While
desirable, this has serious fiscal implications for the CB's income position. Because of the CB's huge
losses, further losses can seriously undermine its effectiveness as the central monetary authority.
It must be emphasized that the CB's continuing losses stem, to a large extent, from the foreign
exchange liabilities of certain public and private enterprises, which it was asked to assume in 1986.
Losses were also incurred through forward and,swap transactions as a result of the steep depreciation
of the peso. Thus, unless a comprehensive solution to CB's financial condition is found, CB may feel
constrained in pursuing a more liberal exchange rate policy, lest it incur possible losses in the process.
A program for a comprehensive and immediate financial restructuring of the CB needs to
be seriously considered in this context. However designed, such a restructuring program must be able
to provide a mechanism for clearing from the CB's book the following major sources of its losses: (a)
the foreign exchange liabilities assumed from public and private enterprises transferred by the
national government; and (b) outstanding forward and swap accounts. This may require a phased
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transfer or assumption in part or whole of these accounts by the government,which is responsible
for them, in the first place; or, a substantial equity infusion by the government into the CB; or both.
Equity infusion into the CB requires amendments to the Central Bank Charter, hence, the
requisite legislation. On the other hand, the transfer of liabilities may be accomplished along similar
PNB and DBP rehabilitation schemes.
There are currently two pending bills in Congressproposing the creation of a truly independent
monetary authority. The House version introduces amendments to the present Central Bank Act, while
the Senate version is a much more radical departure in that it proposes an entirely new charter for the
CB. These bills can be consolidated and harmonized with appropriate amendments on the CB's
capitalization level, so as to address the viability issue.
It is important that because of the nature and magnitude of these accounts in the CB's book, the
problem has to be dealt with promptly. Otherwise, the CB will incur continuing losses due to exchange
rate and interest rate movements, and furthermore, the stability and development of the Philippine
financial system willbe jeopardized. Unless a comprehensive solution to the CB's financial problem
is found, its grip on monetary and exchange rate policies will remain weak.
2. Bank Entry and Branching
Although the existing policy on bank entry and branching is now more liberal than inthe past,
existing rules must be regularly reviewed to allow further relaxation of entry and branching
regulations. The current policy which allows commercial and thrift banks to bid for franchises in the
establishment of branches needs to be reassessed. Uncle: this scheme, big banks have the decided
advantage because of the relative size of their resources. Tlais may result in the perpetuation, if
not accentuation, of a more oligopolistic structure for the banking industry, with implications on
efficiency and cost.
3. Strengthening Bank Supervision and Regulation
Despite improvements in the financial environment, the Philippine financial system continu_
to suffer from stress. This results from the continuing macroeconomic instability and the effects of
past behavior of borrowers and lenders. Mismanagement and speculation have occurred because
prudential regulations and supervision and the underlying legal codes or framework for addressing
specific areas are inadequate. Because of the potential negative consequences for the economy of
a weak banking system, measures to strengthen the underlying laws and regulations must be
vigorously addressed.
The CB in 1987 proposed a number of measures to strengthen its supervisory and regulatory
functions. These involved amendments to the General Banking Act. Some of these proposals were
subsequently adopted by the World Bank Mission, in addition to its own set of recommendations that
were incorporated in the set of conditions attached to the Financial Sector Adjustment Loan. There
are also existing bills in Congress that address some of the identified concerns. Most of the concerns
raised earlier which require changes in the underlying rules on banking regulations have been
68
addressed by the CB, or are currently being studied. Only those that require amendmeats to the
General Banking Act and of the Central Bank Act remain pending.
Of particular importance is the proposal to empower the CB to issue cease and desist orders.
This recommendation has tremendous importance in countering insider abuse at an early stage. The
main advantage of a cease and desist order is that the CB will possess a new instrument of intermediate
nature that can be used in a graduated manner, well before the maximum means of resorting to
liquidation proceedings. A cease and desist order also provides an affLrmative action of correcting
unsafe and unsound banking practice. Its use will deflect charges that the CB's actions are too harsh
and drastic. Empowering the CB to issue a cease and desist order requires amendment of its charter.
This requirement is already addressed by the consolidated Senate Bill 1902. However, because of the
need to address the financial condition of the CB, a further review and incorporation of necessary
amendments to the bill are necessary.
4. Enhanced Role for the PDIC
The PDIC is currently playing a passive role in the financial market. Bechuse of its low
capitalization, it has relied on borrowings from the CB to pay insured depositors. On the one hand,
the current practice of the CB staff to act as conservators, receivers and liquidators of failing banks
gives rise to questions of conflict of interest, and also puts a heavy burden on the CB. On the other hand,
it deprives the PDIC of any authority in the affairs of a failing bank even though the PDIC is responsible
to pay depositors of insured banks. To address these concerns, the PDIC's role should be expanded.
As part of its expanded functions, the PDIC should be the receiver in all cases of distressed banks.
With the recent enactment into law of the amendments to its charter, the PDIC is expected to
take on a much more expanded function along the areas suggested above. This is expected to enhance
depositors' protection, and boost their confidence in the banking system.
5. Reduction of Intermediation Costs
Although a much more liberal bank entry and branching policy now exists, the continued
imposition of various intermediation taxes (5% GRT, 20% tax on interest earnings and high reserve
requirements) as well as portfolio-restricting measures (Agri-Agra Law and the deposit retention
scheme), will continue to contribute to high intermediation cost. As noted in previous sections, these
taxes reduee intermediation which in turn affects overall economic growth. It is therefore important that
they are abolished. In view of their fiscal implicafior/s, however, a time-bound phased reduction program
should be undertaken, taking into account the revenue and monetary implications in the case of reserve
requirements.
Likewise, the Agri-Agra lending requirement should be abolished. The agri requirement is
redundant since the scope for profit,,ble =gricultural lending is substantial and generally complied
with, and hence, a quota is not needed On the other hand, the agra requirement is unrealistic and in
any ease does not result in increased lending for agrarian reform beneficiaries. The phase-
out or outfight abolition of these implicit and explicit taxes requires an act of Congress. There are,
however, pending bills which need only to be pushed more vigorously to effect the necessary
legislation. These include HB 31684 and SB 614, which call for the abolition of the 5 percent GRT and
the 25 percent agri-agraloan quotapolicy, respectively. On the other h_d, the abolition and/orfurther
relaxation of the deposit retention scheme, and the reduction of reserve requirements need only
appropriate action by the Monetary Board.
6. Directed Cry. it Programs
Significant progress has been achieved in reducing the CB's role in credit allocation. There
remains, however, a number of directed credit programs operated by government non-financial
institutions. A number of these were just recently implemented, e.g., DTI's Tulong sa Tao (TsT), the
Department of Agriculture's Livelihood Enhancement for Agricultural Development (LEAD), the
Fishery Sector Program (FSP) and the Agro-Industrial Technology Transfer Program (AITTP)
of the Technology and Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC), among others.
Many of these programs have duplicating and overlapping objectives. Institutional
fragmentation has also come about, because the implementing agencies have their own preferences
as to credit delivery institutions. This creates problems not only in coordination and monitoring the
programs' implementation but also in accounting for the actual cost to the government in operating
these programs. Some of these programs continue to charge lower than market rates of interest to final
borrowers. For instance, both the Multi-Livestock Dispersal Loan Program and the Export Industry
Modernization Project II charge 10 percent/per annum, while the LEAD grant-assisted component
provides grant assistance to non-bankable farmers' group. Yet coastal/municipal fishermen under the
Fishery Sector Program have to pay market rates of interest on their loans. The wide range of on-
lending rates has led to a confusing mix of signals regarding the direction of credit policy. It has
also given rise to claims for similar treatment, i.e., same interest rates, by other borrowers who assert
that they are in no better situation than those who get access to credit resources at less than marketrates.
As a result, there has been difficulty in attracting certain groups to participate in programs that charge
market rates of interest
It is therefore suggested that the government undertake a review tow_ds further rationalizing
the interest rate structure and/or consolidating the implementation of these programs. The latter can
be implemented through the transfer of funds and lending£unctions to existing GFIs, i.e., LBP or DBP
as the ease may be. Consolidation can bring about more efficiency in the utilization of funds, create
greater program impact, and minimize subsidy losses to the government.
On the other hand, because of the sectoral thrusts of these different programs, some institutional
mechanisms need to be put in place to set policy directions, monitor performance and coordinate
overall activities. These activities can be undertaken by existing coordinative bodies, such as the
Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC) for agriculture and the newly created Small and Medium
Enterprise Development (SMED) Council for industry.
7. Provision of Term Credit for Agriculture and Industry
A major gap that constrains the development of agriculture and industry is the inadequacy of
reasonably-priced term credit. The importance of team credit cannot be overemphasized. An agro-
industrial devdopmcmt strategy based on post-production processes, such as the processing and/
or manufacture of agro-based and/or industrial commodities, hinges croctally on the provision of term
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credit to finance expansion of existing production facilities and new investments in machineries, post-
harvest facilities, transport and communications, and other durable capital.
In agriculture, it is estimated that demand for investment credit during the next five years will
reach P215 billion (World Bank 1991). In industry, while no corresponding hard estimates are
available on the magnitude of the demand for term credit, it is expected that there will be a substantial
need for financing expansion and new projects in industry as a result of a more fundamentally sound
macroeconomic environment and liberalized foreign investment climate.
The main sources of supply for medium- and long-term credit as noted earlier are government-
directed credit programs. Commercial banks which by far comprise the largest segment of the financial
system generally lend short. This is not surprising because of interest rate and exchange rate volatility
during the past decade. Their limited participation is usually through' 'roll-over" of their short-term
loans and/or by merely acting as lending conduits for funds borrowed from foreign sources or
provided by the government. However, this does not mean that long-term funds are not available in
the financial system as a whole. The 1988 World Bank Report found that private sector insurance
companies, GSIS, SSS and pension funds have consistently generated excess cash. But these have
not been lent to either industry or agriculture to a significant extent because of the absence of
appropriate capability for project appraisal and related skills. What is needed is to develop a
financially viable institutional arrangement which can bring together banks and the providers of long-
term funds.
There are at present two existing institutions which can perform these functions for industry
and agriculture. DBP is the most logical candidate in the case of industry, while LBP can assume a
similar role for agriculture. This institutional arrangement offers the advantage of using DBP's
accumulated experience and expertise in term lending. On the other hand, LBP which is currently
handling the ALF and the Countryside Loan Fund (CLF) is increasingly gaining competence in this area.
It must be emphasized that to avoid possible conflict of interest, DBP and LBP should primarily
undertake wholesale operations. Under this set-up, DBP and LBP assume the liquidity and credit risks
vis-a-vis participating financial institutions. This institutional arrangement does not require any
legislation as these are already being performed to a certain extent. What is needed is essentially
to reorganize and strengthen the institutions. This would require, for instance, the creation of a
specialized unit to handle specific areas and services related to wholesale banking and mobilization
of long-term funds.
Since institutional credit is unlikely to be made available to MSMEs with insufficient
collateral, MSMEs access to institutional credit can be improved through appropriate credit guarantee
programs. However, provision of credit guarantee should be strictly based on the project viability.
Some minimum c_ollateral security should also be required to minimize adverse selection problems
among borrowers. There are at present eight credit guarantee institutions/programs in the Philippines.
These are the Quedan and Rural Credit Guarantee Corporation (QRCGC), Philippine Crop Insurance
Corporation (PCIC), Bagong Pagkain ng Bayan (BPnB), Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium
Enterprises (GFSME), the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan •Guarantee Corporation
(Philguarantee), the Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation (SBGFC), the Bankers
Association of the Philippines (BAP) Credit Guarantee Corporation, and the USAID-supported credit
•guarantee corporation. Of these, only GFSME, the SBGFC, the USAID-supported guarantee and
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Philguarantee provide credit guarantee for small and medium enterprises. The first provides credit
guarantee for domestic producers while the latter two service exporters. The SBGFC rides on the
existing credit guarantee facilities/operations ofGFSME. Only GFSME pro:vides credit guarantee for
term loans.
Given the projected demand for term credit, it is unlikely that the current level of capitalization
of GFSME can meet the projected demand to a significant extent. Because of size and maturity
features, this may necessitate increased capitalization and other amendments in its charter via
appropriate legislation.
8. Rediscounting and Supply. of Export Finance
The adoption of a realistic exchange rate policy, while a key ingredient to an export-oriented
strategy, needs to be complemented by improved access of existing as well as potential exporters to
adequate export financing. The most important export financing scheme is the CB rediscount window.
In 1983, outstanding rediscotmts to the commercial banking system was P8.8 billion. This
dropped to P5.4 billion in 1985 as a result of the reduced demand for credit following the
implementation of stabilization measures from 1984 to 1985. The drop in the level of outstanding
rediscounts continued until 1988, followed by a slight increase in 1989. In 1990, outstanding
rediscounts in nominal terms increased significantly to P6.6 billion. The limited access to export
financing is clearly indicated by the ratio of export rediscounts to value of exports. As of 1990,
rediscounted export papers covered only two percent of the total value of exports. This was even lower
than the 1985 figure (Table 14).
The decline in export loans is largely related to the fact that the export window is part of the
overall rediscount window which, since 1986, has been realigned to manage liquidity in the financial
system. Thus, during periods of tight liquidity, exporters' access to financing is restricted which is
often just the time when access to export loans is critical. Given the importance of export financing
in enhancing the performance of the country's export sectors, some refinancing mechanism must be
developed that will 'insulate' the export sector from overall liquidity conditions in the financial market.
One suggested mechanism is a special revolving rediscount window for direct and indirect
exporters which is not partof the regular rediscounting window. This can be priced at near market rate
to minimize distortions. Note that while this facility can provide liquidity to banks, it is unlikely by
itself to significantly improve access and availability of export credit to SMEs, especially first-time
exporters, who may not be perceived as creditworthy for lack of adequate information on their export
potential and track record. As such it is important that the establishment of this rediscount window
be complemented with the establishment and/or strengthening of an effective preshipment credit
guarantee mechanism.
Philguarantee is currently providing this kind of service to a limited number of exporters. BAP
Credit Guarantee Corporation plans to go into this but has yet to operationalize its guarantee window.
With increased participation of MSMEs _d new exporters, its effectiveness will depend significantly
on how it can deal with the informational problem of ereditworthiness described above, and the
level of guarantee exposureit can accommodate. This may require more intensive efforts at gathering
Table 14:OUTSTANDING REDISCOUNTS OF THE CENTRAL BANK, LOANS OUTSTANDING OF COMMERCIAL BANKS (KBs) AND EXPORT VALUES
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
1. Redisoounting 12063 13298 8812 4835 5425 3487 3944 3678 4459 6579
Rice and Corn 1489 1573 28 -
Expods 5846 6122 3844 2092 2162 1174 1736 1gQ9 2687 4594
Sugar 3110 3539 1889 1446 834 822 809 797 788 776
Tradi_onal 1234 950 72 243 64 226 231 342 421
Non-Trad_ 1502 1633 1883 646 1085 288 701 971 1557 3397
GoldandCopper
Emm'gs_cy/Specid Credit
Accomodations 3726 3905 3S12 2317 2694 1887 1768 1514 1520 1306
Others 1002 1696 1428 426 569 426 440 165 252 679
2. Total LoaneOutstanding 86505 98240 115390 120355 91627 88325 101112 126615 165858 149860
3. Value of Exports ($) 5722 5021 5005 S391 4629 4842 5720 7074 7821 8186
Exchange Rate 7.9095 8.5507 11.1345 16.6984 18.7334 20.3791 20.5607 21.0654 21.7204 28.1250
Value of Exports(P) 45258 42933 65728 90621 68717 98676 117607 149017 169875 230231
4, Ratio: Export Rediscounting/Loans 6,76 6.23 3.33 1.74 2.35 1,33 1,72 1.58 1,62 3.07
Outstanding
5. Ratio: LoansOutstanding/Vofue of 191.14 228.62 207.06 133.70 t05.89 89.51 85.97 84.97 97.64 65.09
Exp_ (P)
6. Ratio: Export Rediscounting/l"otal
RedisoDunting 49.46 46.64 43.62 43.27 39.85 33.67 44.02 54.35 60.26 69.83
7. Flatio:Export RediscountingNalue
of Exports 12.92 14.26 6.90 2.32 2.49 1.19 1.48 1.34 1.58 2.00
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and disseminating information among the MSMEs. Subject to the actual magnitude of credit demand,
it may also call forth increased capitalization that can be accomplished through legislation.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS '.r , L
Based on the analysis of th O, impact of existing policies, this study identified the gaps and
outlined a set_ of policy initiatives on money, credit and banking supportive of an agro-industrial
development strategy. It is emphasized, however, that while monetary and banking policies can be
made supportive of developmental thrusts, they cannot work independently of the rest of macroecon-
omic policies. Recent experiences with financial reforms show that financial reforms carried out
against an unstable macroeconomic background can heighten instability. Complete liberalization
of interest rates in countries with high and unstable rates of inflation can lead to high real interest rates
and wide spreads be_een lending and deposit rates. Moreover, because of therigidity and other
existing distortions in the other sectors and markets, rapid deregulation in the financial system may
worsen matters by causing the financial system to respond more flexibly to bad signals.
As recent P_: ippine experience illustrates, financial development entails more than defacto
liberalization ofinterest rates. Deregulation of the financial system must be complemented by measures
aimed at improving the foundations of banking and finance for the enforcement of contracts,
disclosure requirements, and the structure of prudential regulation and supervision. Effective
regulation and supervision by bank management, by market forces, and by public authorities are all
necessary to reduce recklessness and fraud.
Moreover, liberalization should not be limited to the reform of the banking system. It should
seek to develop a more broadly based financial system that will include money and capital m_kets
and nonbank intermediaries. Finally, given the prerogative of Congress in setting policy, it is
imperative that the Executive Branch and/or the Central Bank establish close coordination with
Congress in the pursuit of policy changes requiring legislation, and to forestall legislative initiatives
that undermine current policy reforms.
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